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LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Judged by its reception in the enacting legislatures, the
[Uniform Commercial] Code is the most spectacular success story
in the history ofAmerican law.
-James J. White & Robert S. Summers'
[W]hat becomes global is not so much the . . . nitty-gritty
American law, but rather its spectacular aspects. It is not
efficiency but the spectacle of efficiency .... -Ugo Matte?
INTRODUCTION
Rationality cannot explain current levels of commercial
activity and forms of commercial law. How can continuously
expanding access to credit be efficient when staggering
environmental costs of over-development seem obvious? 3 A turn
to aesthetics directs attention to the non-rational, pre-reflective
elements at play in commercial law. It is crucial to consider these
1. James J. White & Robert S. Summers, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 4
(5th ed. 2000).
2. Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on US. Hegemony and
the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 383, 438 (2003).
3. See generally Dolores Hayden, A FIELD GUIDE TO SPRAWL (2004), and
discussion infra Part III. This article does not employ law and economics
methodologies. The term "rationality" in this context means that the current law
just does not make sense because it facilitates, and does nothing to check, over-
development. It is inefficient in the (Kaldor-Hicks) sense that if a cost-benefit
analysis that internalizes social costs could be done, it would find enormous
costs that must outweigh the benefits of encouraging ever-escalating levels of
commercial activity. Whether or not a given policy is efficient is not a
knowable fact in the world because we can never definitively know and quantify
all externalities. Some say that the concept of efficiency itself only makes sense
in the context of a particular exchange (that is presumably efficient), and,
beyond that, "efficiency" is a term without practical relevance. See, e.g., David
Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179
(1994). But the fact that total externalities are unknowable does not defeat an
argumet that certain laws are so costly that they should be carefully re-
examined. The concept of efficiency has a history and usage in legal
argumentation and scholarship that often departs from parameters of the field of
economics. This is not to say, of course, that parameters of economic modeling
exclude, necessarily, consideration of social costs. Cf Reza Dibadj, Weasel
Numbers, 27 CARDozo L. REv. 1325 (2006) (discussing the necessity for
welfare economics of dealing with "weasel numbers," or numbers that
encompass value judgments, in providing useful input for policymakers).
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suppressed elements as legal professionals applaud U.S.
commercial law's facilitation of commercial activity here and
superiority for attracting investment abroad.4
Aesthetics 5 affect 6 legal actors' expectations and uses of
commercial law.7 Certain aesthetics of commercial law in the
4. See discussion infra note 137, and Part IV.B.
5. The field of aesthetics, generally, is the philosophy of art and beauty.
However, the study of aesthetics has evolved to include analysis of the full range
of sensory input that we encounter and that shapes our preferences, values, and
reactions. It includes analysis of wide-ranging subjects; its concerns are not
limited to art or explicitly artistic endeavors. See, e.g., F.R. Ankersmit,
AESTHETIC POLITICS: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BEYOND FACT AND VALUE
(1996); John Dewey, ARTS As EXPERIENCE (1934) (finding that the aesthetic
applies to everyday experience and not just art); Terry Eagleton, THE IDEOLOGY
OF THE AESTHETIC (1990) (espousing a view of art as ideology); Joseph H.
Kupfer, EXPERIENCE AS ART: AESTHETICS IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1983) (including
sports in everyday aesthetics); Andrew Light & Jonathan M. Smith, THE
AESTHETICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE ix (2005) (recognizing "a new arena of
aesthetic inquiry-the broader world itself'); Richard Shustern, Somaesthetics:
A Disciplinary Proposal, 57 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 299 (1999)
(discussing Alexander Baumgarten, AESTHETICA (1750), which proposes an
aesthetic of wide-ranging practical importance, encompassing much more than
fine art and natural beauty).
6. "Aesthetics" in plural form normally takes a singular verb, as in:
"Aesthetics is a branch of philosophy." This article uses the plural verb form
because it is referring to specific aesthetics-grid aesthetic, energy aesthetic,
instrumentalist aesthetic---collectively. Also, this article employs a subjectivist
aesthetic in its understanding of the aesthetics of commercial law. On this issue
of reflexivity, see discussion infra note 49 and accompanying text. Within a
subjectivist aesthetic, "aesthetics" has properties of a subject, such as a will.
Certain aesthetics of commercial law shape, limit, affect, etc., possibilities for
this law.
7. See supra notes 5-6 and infra Part I for discussion of how this work
uses aesthetics. In recent decades numerous scholars have written, with varying
approaches and purposes, about the aesthetics of law. See, e.g., Costas Douzinas
& Ronnie Warrington, JUSTICE MISCARRIED: ETHICS, AESTHETICS AND THE LAW
(1994); Adam Gearey, LAW AND AESTHETICS (2001); LAW AND AESTHETICS
(Roberta Kevelson ed., 1992); LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART
AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999)
[hereinafter LAW AND THE IMAGE]; Desmond Manderson, SONGS WITHOUT
MUSIC: AESTHETIC DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE (2000); Pierre Schlag,
THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 98-111 (1998) [hereinafter Schlag, THE
ENCHANTMENT] (describing objectivist and subjectivist aesthetics in conceptions
of American law); Brian E. Butler, Aesthetics and American Law, 27 LEGAL
STUD. F. 203 (2003); Patrick 0. Gudridge, Mit Schlag (Repetitions), 57 U.
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United States 8  privilege commercial actors by deterring
consideration of legal limitations on commercial activity that could
be socially desirable. 9
MIAMI L. REV. 607 (2003); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (describing an aesthetic
connection between arguments for standards and altruistic political positions
that challenge premises of classical liberalism, rules, and individualist positions
that reinforce liberalism); Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study
of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973 (2005) (discussing
aesthetic dimensions of technocratic approaches to law); Anna di Robilant, The
Aesthetics of Law, in 1 GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES 1 (2001), available at
http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/voll/iss2/artl/; Pierre Schlag, The
Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1047 (2002) [hereinafter
Schlag, The Aesthetics]; Jacqueline Stevens, Legal Aesthetics of the Family and
the Nation: AgoraXChange and Notes Towards Re-Imagining the Future, 49
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 317 (2004); Robin West, Jurisprudence As Narrative: An
Aesthetic Analysis of Modem Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145 (1985)
(presenting legal theory as a form of narrative, an aesthetic object).
8. The term "commercial law" can have a slightly different scope in
different jurisdictions. In the United States, it references the subjects included in
the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), and can also include some elements of
bankruptcy law, laws governing asset securitization, and international
conventions pertaining to these subjects. It is conceptually and statutorily
separate from corporate law. In some foreign jurisdictions, "commercial law"
includes a wider range of subjects, such as laws governing business entities.
See, e.g., Henri Gunanto, The Impact of U.S. Law Propositions on Indonesian
Commercial Law, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1996) (noting that
commercial law in Indonesia includes the law on corporations and limited
liability companies).
9. There are numerous possible limitations on commercial activity that
could be socially desirable. Some exist in other jurisdictions, such as priority
schemas that privilege wage or labor claims, for example. Others have been
proposed to the drafters of the UCC and flatly rejected without serious
consideration-for example, an equity carve-out to UCC Article 9's priority
structure. For an example of a hypothetical commercial law reform,
consideration of which is deterred by aesthetics, see discussion infra notes 94-
95. The project here is to present aesthetics of commercial law and explore how
they obscure thorough vetting of these types of proposed reforms-not to defend
the desirability of the specific reforms themselves. This work defines the gap
between what exists (which is problematic) and what is ideal (which is yet to be
determined). If defining this gap reveals that perhaps it cannot be bridged with a
law reform proposal, that does not mean that there is nothing to be done about
problems in commercial law. It just means that a proposal to reform commercial
law statutes that offends the law's aesthetics is not likely to have traction. Short
[Vol. 67692
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Problematic trends and features of commercial law take two
different forms. First, there are types of commercial transactions
encouraged by U.S. commercial law that raise both fairness and
efficienc concerns. Such transactions include full priority secured
lending' and asset securitization." Second, the sheer size and
volume of commercial transactions and the lack of legal controls
requiring market actors to internalize ensuing economic, social,
and environmental costs raise serious questions about the
desirability of laws designed to encourage perpetually escalating
levels of commercial activity.
These problematic aspects of commercial law invoke very
difficult questions. How do we determine what levels and forms of
commercial activity are optimal or good? If commitment to a
more balanced or tempered approach to commercial activity were
possible, who would be helped, who would be harmed, and how?
Aesthetics of commercial law deter engagement with these
questions by informing certain pre-reflective dispositions that
enable common refrains against reform, such as: Any reduction in
levels of commercial activity will most harm labor and the poor. 2
Much of contemporary commercial law scholarship in the
United States engages controversial questions in commercial law
with economic modeling or with empiricism. Arguments about the
efficiency of statutes encouraging secured lending or asset
securitization, for example, have met unanswered (and perhaps
unanswerable) empirical questions about the effects of these
transactions on third parties. Now, prominent commercial law
scholars pursue answers to empirical questions about the
distributive consequences of U.S. commercial law. Empirical
findings or successful economic models, however, do not
automatically become fruitful bases for law reform. These
findings encounter deep-running, visceral expectations of
commercial law as an engine for economic development. Our
collective, visceral expectations for commercial law are grounded
in aesthetics.
of reform of the UCC itself, there is a lot to be done in terms of activism and in
terms of scholarship that considers how to use law to encourage commercial
actors to pursue responsible, value-adding projects.
10. For a description of this type of financing and the fairness and
efficiency issues it raises, see discussion infra notes 84-89.
11. For a description of this type of financing and the fairness and
efficiency issues it raises, see discussion infra notes 100-02.
12. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
2007] 693
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Karl Llewellyn, a central architect of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC"),' wrote in 1942 that "law out of harmony with life
• . .cannot have right beauty.' 14 Remarks that cast the UCC in
aesthetic terms-that speak of its beauty and logic-appear
throughout its history.15 This article is a twenty-first century take
on U.S. commercial law that brings together current realities in the
commercial world and contemporary approaches to legal
aesthetics.
The lens of aesthetics offers insights into current formulations
and trends in commercial law that analyses of the UCC drafting
process or the technical complexity of the Code or ingrained
ideological tilt (away from distributive justice) do not capture.' 6
This critique has a political valence in that it expresses concern for
distributive and environmental justice and a need for legal
limitation on certain types of commercial activity. However, the
aesthetics of commercial law themselves do not necessarily reflect
any particular political leaning. The contention that certain
aesthetics of commercial law privilege commercial actors is a
statement about consequences of contemporary deployments of
commercial law aesthetics, not about ideological bias inherent in
these aesthetics. Commercial law itself and lawmakers, scholars,
and practitioners who work in the field exhibit certain aesthetics
that are constitutive of commercial law on a fundamental level.
These aesthetics inform our collective sense of possibilities for
commercial law before the questions of distributive justice or
drafting process or technical feasibility even come into play.
The question of which aesthetics, and which approaches to
commercial law, are the right ones or the best ones is not answered
13. Citations herein to the UCC are to the official text and comments of the
American Law Institute ("ALI") and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL").
14. See K.N. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U.
CHi. L. REv. 224, 248 (1942).
15. See, e.g., White & Summers, supra note 1 (discussing "UCC
Romanticism"); Carl Felsenfeld, But the Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial
Code Was Adopted, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 597 (1993).
16. This study is not interdisciplinary in the sense of comparing the branch
of philosophy known as aesthetics to the study of law. Some works on law and
aesthetics disavow the label interdisciplinary and characterize themselves
instead as transdisciplinary. See, e.g., Manderson, supra note 7, at 36. Law and
aesthetics is transdisciplinary in the sense that aesthetics is a dimension of
human experience, which is already found in law. This article adopts the view
that using aesthetics to analyze law is a transdisciplinary exercise.
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here. 17  This is not a presentation of "dominant" aesthetics of
commercial law, made with the hope of presenting some better,
"alternative" aesthetics. The aesthetics of commercial law exist
and are too non-rational to be susceptible to reasoned arguments
for change. Understanding aesthetics of commercial law, however,
is essential to recognizing and resisting visceral expectations that
undermine meaningful engagement with tough questions about
optimal levels and forms of commercial transactions. In other
words, aesthetics cannot be reformed, but consequences of certain
aesthetics can be altered in the process of considering the value of
different approaches to commercial law.
Part I describes how this article uses aesthetics. Part II
considers an energy aesthetic, 18 a grid aesthetic,' 9 and an
instrumentalist aesthetic 20 to assess how we apprehend commercial
law and its possibilities. 21  Part III presents aesthetics of
commercial law in relation to sublimity to describe simultaneous
awe and fear surrounding large-scale commercial activity. 22 Part
IV considers consequences of aesthetics of commercial law in the
contexts of (1) common refrains against reform of controversial
aspects of this law, and (2) the spread of a form of imperial law in
which the export of U.S. commercial law models is complicit.
I. AESTHETICS AND LAW
Some scholars contend that the field of aesthetics addresses
form and that content is irrelevant; others reject the notion that
form and content can be separated. This piece views the form and
the content of commercial law as inseparable in understanding the
aesthetics of this law. 23 Similarly, some view aesthetics as form
17. See sources cited infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
18. See discussion infra Part II.A.
19. See discussion infra Part II.B.
20. See discussion infra Part II.C.
21. The grid and energy aesthetics have been described in work by Pierre
Schlag. See generally Schlag, The Aesthetics, supra note 7. Schlag also
describes an objectivist aesthetic that is like the instrumentalist aesthetic
discussed infra Part II.C. For a discussion of how this work builds upon and
departs from Schlag's work, see infra Part I.
22. See discussion infra Part III.
23. Note the difference between this article's use of aesthetics as opposed to
semiotics or epistemology. Semiotics is concerned with the meaning that form
references, with the meanings associated with or referenced by signs; it can be
closely related to aesthetics. See Roberta Kevelson, Introduction: Dialectic,
Conflicts in Cultural Norms, Laws and Legal Aesthetic, in LAW AND
2007]
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only and others view aesthetics also in terms of effects (such as
sublimity). This work looks to effects of commercial law-
including some sublime effects-in its understanding of both the
aesthetics of commercial law and aesthetic consequences of
commercial law. The purpose, here, is to excavate suppressed,
constitutive elements of U.S. commercial law-not to maintain
fidelity to a particular branch of philosophy.
The question arises: Is it legal aesthetics that privilege
commercial actors and not politics or ideology?24  Politics and
ideology strive for coherence of normative commitments or values.
The pre-reflective preferences or vantage points in commercial law
that this article presents are best captured by aesthetics in that they
AESTHETICS, supra note 7, at 1 (treating aesthetics as the normative basis for the
symbolic order). Kevelson's view places aesthetics beyond the self-
referentiality of the semiotic world. Id. For Kevelson, aesthetics is a crucial
part of semiotics in that it can explain the ordering of signs that are integral to
law. Id. On the other hand, Desmond Manderson finds that, though both
semiotics and aesthetics emphasize the infinite, pervasive influence of symbols,
they are very different approaches. See Manderson, supra note 7, at 38-39.
Semiotics studies placeholders for deeper meaning. Aesthetics captures how we
feel about both signs and the things to which they refer. Aesthetics does not
precede or transcend the circle of signs or semiotic representations. It merely
asserts that the form of something is part of its meaning.
The focus here will be on the structure of commercial law and the
meanings, visceral feelings, and pre-reflective responses to such structure that
shape the possibilities and functions of commercial law. This article may
consider symbolic elements or qualities of the UCC and discuss the meanings
such elements reference.
Like semiotics, epistemology can be closely related to aesthetics, and
scholars have differing approaches to the relationship between these fields. In
contrast to Nelson Goodman's approach, for example, some scholars regard
aesthetics as limited to considerations of form itself, as not encompassing the
content or effects of form. Nelson Goodman, a prominent philosopher
working in the field of epistemology and aesthetics, regards aesthetics as a
branch of epistemology. See Catherine Z. Elgin, Goodman, Nelson, in A
COMPANION TO AESTHETICS 175 (David Cooper ed., 1992) (describing
Goodman's central contention that aesthetics explain how art enhances
understanding, making aesthetics a branch of epistemology). Aesthetics (and
semiotics) can be central to how we know what law is and what law can do. To
the extent that this article's analysis of the aesthetics of commercial law speaks
to how we come to know what commercial law and commercial activity are, it
may be described as epistemological.
24. For additional explanation of the difference between aesthetics of law
and ideology in law, see discussion infra note 38.
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precede and defy the kinds of attempts at reasoned justification that
are the hallmark of ideological or political commitments.
Scholarship on law and aesthetics has taken a variety of
forms.25 The scholarship on law and aesthetics that is most
relevant to this article treats law itself as an aesthetic
phenomenon. 26 In a discussion of critical legal studies and images
of law, Adam Geary writes: "Just as the image represents and
distorts reality by making what is fluid appear fixed and
25. The most straightforward applications of aesthetics to law involve
analysis of laws related to beauty or art. For example, scholars have analyzed
how presentation of disfigurement has affected tort law and how a widow's
beauty and chances of remarriage are calculated by the court. See, e.g.,
Manderson, supra note 7, at 41 (discussing Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093
(Cal. 1960)); see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880 (Can.); Manderson, supra note 7, at 28.
Treatment by courts and legislatures of issues like the protection of the
environment reveal how the law responds to beauty. Zoning regulations (and
adjudication of challenges to such regulations) recognize and validate aesthetic
considerations as a basis for limiting property rights. See LAW AND THE IMAGE,
supra note 7, at 4 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), that it is within the power of the legislature to limit
property rights in order to ensure that a community be beautiful, spacious, and
clean, among other considerations).
Other scholars have addressed how the architecture, images, and
iconography of law are central to constructions of legal authority. See, e.g.,
Peter Goodrich, Specula Laws: Image, Aesthetic and Common Law, in LAW AND
AESTHETICS, supra note 7, at 205; Martin Jay, Must Justice Be Blind? The
Challenge of Images to the Law, in LAW AND THE IMAGE, supra note 7, at 19.
Peter Goodrich, for example, considers the aesthetics of courthouses, robes,
statuary, and insignia in production of legal text. See generally Goodrich, supra.
Martin Jay explores representations of the goddess Justitia and the contemporary
convention of presenting Justitia as blind or blindfolded in allegorical images of
Justice. See generally Jay, supra; see also Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik,
Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727 (1987). Institutions, like courts and law
firms, are aesthetically packaged to convey authority. Butler, supra note 7, at
209.
In manufacturing its own legitimacy, law offers justification grounded
in an aesthetic of reason. Id.; cf. Schlag, THE ENCHANTMENT, supra note 7, at
133 (describing the rationalist self as a construction of aesthetics).
In a slightly different vein, Christine Haight Farley critiques how
adjudicators address the question of what is art. See Christine Haight Farley,
Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REv. 805 (2005) (arguing that judges should engage the
field of aesthetics in adjudication involving questions about art).
26. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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unchanging, law is criticized as a reification of the world., 2 7
Desmond Manderson finds that to engage the aesthetic is to
consider what the law actually means to us and how it does so. He
writes:
It is part of what Derrida calls the "white [transparent]
mythology" of the West to characterize its law as being
purely logical and without those mythic and mystic elements
which exist only in more "primitive" societies .... The task
of aesthetics is to explore and reclaim these elements ...
from the interstices and margins of the law.28
Building on Geary and Manderson, Pierre Schlag, in The
Aesthetics of American Law2 9 ("The Aesthetics"), describes law as
an aesthetic enterprise.30  Schlag presents the aesthetics of law,
meaning the recurrent forms that shape the creation, apprehension,
and identity of law.31 He writes: "Legal aesthetics are important
because they help to constitute the law and its possibilities in
different ways. Often these constitutive effects occur at a
prereflective level."32
Schlag presents in The Aesthetics four basic legal aesthetics
that characterize American law: (1) the energy aesthetic; (2) the
grid aesthetic; (3) the perspectivist aesthetic; and (4) the
dissociative aesthetic. 33  The energy aesthetic presents law as
moving and changing in the constant push and pull of varying
principles, policy objectives, political valences, and values. 34 Law
cast in the energy aesthetic is directional-it progresses.
27. Geary, supra note 7, at 25.
28. Manderson, supra note 7, at 37.
29. Schlag, The Aesthetics, supra note 7.
30. Schlag's approach in The Aesthetics is more extensive than his approach
to legal aesthetics in The Enchantment. Compare Schlag, The Aesthetics, supra
note 7, with Schlag, THE ENCHANTMENT, supra note 7. The Aesthetics sets out
major categories of recurring forms, experiences, and pre-reflective stances that
pervade American legal thought and lawmaking. Schlag, The Aesthetics, supra
note 7.
31. Several scholars have criticized Schlag's work in The Aesthetics. See,
e.g., Butler, supra note 7; Dennis M. Davis, Dissonance Orientation: The
Occupational Hazard of Being a Judge or a Requirement for the Job?, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 853 (2003); David A. Westbrook, Three Meditations on How
Law Rules After Globalization, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 337 (2003).
32. Schlag, The Aesthetics, supra note 7, at 1117.
33. Id. at 1051-52.
34. Id.
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The grid aesthetic, on the other hand, pictures law as divided
into bounded spaces or categories. Doctrines are divided into
rules, which are divided into elements. Different areas of law-
labor law, property law, family law, tax law-are parceled into
discrete areas with well-marked boundaries. The grid aesthetic
enables and is produced by, for example, drafting statutes with
categorical definitions.
The perspectivist aesthetic views law as mutating in response
to the social or political identity of the viewer. The perspectivist
aesthetic enables and is produced by, for example, the practice of
rejecting the "reasonable person" standard in tort law in favor of,
as appropriate, a reasonable woman standard, a reasonable battered
woman standard, etc.
35
The dissociative aesthetic conveys the collapsibility of all other
legal categories, perspectives or aesthetics. It pictures law as
highly unstable and legal categories or distinctions in perpetual
disintegration. The identifiable relations of perspectivism, the
fixed identities of the grid, and the quantifiable magnitudes of
energ 6 have all collapsed, and attempts to resurrect them appear
futile. The dissociative aesthetic is an experience of radicalized
perspectivism in which legal actors feel a collapse of sustainable
differentiations. 37  Legal actors frequently encounter the
dissociative aesthetic as they engage the complexity of legal
problems. This aesthetic then necessarily yields to a reduction to
arguments steeped in an energy, grid, or even perspectivist
aesthetic in order to do lawmaking.
In addition to these four basic categories of legal aesthetics, in
his earlier work Schlag describes objectivist and subjectivist
aesthetics of law. These aesthetics capture how we see law as an
object (principles and rules treated as if they had the attributes of
physical reality) and a subject (endowed with a will for binding,
counseling, allowing, etc.) at the same time.38
35. For a discussion of incoherence that can arise when litigators deploy the
perspectivist aesthetic, see Heather Lauren Hughes, Contradictions, Open
Secrets, and Feminist Faith in Enlightenment, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 187,
204-05 (2002) (discussing the act/status dilemma as it relates to a battered
woman litigant and arguments that courts should consider what is reasonable
from her perspective).
36. Schlag, The Aesthetics, supra note 7, at 1052.
37. Id. at 1092-93.
38. See Schlag, THE ENCHANTMENT, supra note 7, at 98-111. Schlag's
presentation of objectivist and subjectivist legal aesthetics can function as
another version of the presentations of internal incoherence in law that recur in
critical legal scholarship. See Duncan Kennedy, Pierre Schlag's The
2007] 699
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Enchantment of Reason, 57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 513, 528-34 (2003) (book
review).
This article understands The Aesthetics to be presenting a multiplicity of
some major (but certainly not all) pre-reflective, conflicting aesthetics in
American law. To the extent that these various aesthetics co-exist and conflict
in ways that are logically irreconcilable, they indicate incoherence in law.
Schlag's approach to legal aesthetics differs from the critical legal studies
("CLS") incoherence and indeterminacy thesis, however. Schlag presents a
multiplicity of conflicting conceptions of law and legal argumentation that co-
exist in infinite combinations, not paired argument tropes or ideological
impulses that exist in intractable contradiction. Cf Pierre Schlag, LAYING
DowN THE LAW 79-90 (1996). In contrast, the basic CLS presentation of
incoherence describes conceptual contradictions (between, for example, value
objectivity and subjectivity, free will and determinism, individualism and
altruism) that are paired in binary opposition, that cannot be consistently
reconciled, and that pervade liberal legal thought. See generally Kennedy, supra
note 7. These contradictions are understood in part as a reflection in legal
rhetoric and thought of binary oppositions in language described in the work of
twentieth century Continental philosophers. CLS theory argues that liberal legal
thought suppresses recognition of conceptual contradictions by de-emphasizing
one of the two poles within a contradiction (for example, altruism), leaving the
opposite pole (individualism) in a privileged position in legal discourse. This
suppression of contradiction and privileging of one pole facilitates ideological
bias in law, as, for example, individualism (as opposed to altruism) tends to
reinforce premises of classical liberalism that we commonly associate with
ideological conservatism or the political right. See generally Mark Hager,
Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by Mark Kelman,
37 AM. U. L. Rev. 1051 (1988) (book review); Kennedy, supra note 7; Duncan
Kennedy, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997); E. Dana Neacsu, CLS Stands
for Critical Legal Studies, If Anyone Remembers, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 415 (2000);
John Stick, Charting the Development of Critical Legal Studies, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 407 (1988) (reviewing Mark Kelman, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIEs (1987)). In addition, CLS theory contends that incoherence in law
yields indeterminacy of result and indeterminacy of justification in adjudication.
This is because the two sides of conceptual contradictions are inextricable and
intractable such that a judge can deploy either side in any case, enabling a
reasoned opinion in favor of either party. See generally Kennedy, supra;
Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma,
54 U. CHI. L. REv. 462 (1987). Many legal actors, and most CLS scholars,
understand indeterminacy as a situs of inevitable ideological intervention in
lawmaking. The CLS notion that ideological bias is inherent in lawmaking
stems from these theories about the consequences of a certain mode of
incoherence in law (rooted in understanding of binary oppositions). However,
ideological bias is not necessarily inherent in all forms of incoherence. Various
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Schlag's energy, grid, perspectivist, dissociative, and
objectivist/subjectivist aesthetics are legal in the sense that they are
instanced in the traditional legal materials, used in opinions, rules,
doctrines, etc. 39  Moments of deploying aesthetics in law are
unavoidable and do not answer to choice or reason (except if the
aesthetic in place has already situated choice and reason as
determinative).4 ° Schlag writes: "To appreciate the aesthetic
dimension of law is to understand that the forms of law mark not
only the law we apprehend as already in place, but also the ways in
which we think and do law and the ways in which we imagine its
future."
41
This critique takes parts of Schlag's basic legal aesthetic
taxonomy, applies them to commercial law, and explores
consequences of the aesthetics of commercial law in terms of
sublimity42 and in terms of concerns for global justice. 43 It departs
from Schlag's approach in some important ways. First, Schlag's
presentation of the dissociative aesthetic invokes the sublime-the
term that the field of aesthetics uses to denote fantastic horror or
awe.44 Perhaps Schlag declined to explicitly relate this legal
aesthetic to the sublime in order to avoid any idealization of
aesthetics. I share Schlag's distaste for romanticization of law and
idealization of aesthetics. However, it is crucial to consider
aesthetics of law present irreconcilable, pre-reflective preferences embedded in
law and legal thinking. They do not, in and of themselves, indicate political or
ideological valence.
The contention that certain aesthetics of commercial law privilege
commercial actors is a statement about consequences of current deployments of
legal aesthetics in the commercial law context, not about ideological bias in the
legal aesthetics themselves. Note that The Honorable Dennis M. Davis
criticizes Schlag for "conceptualiz[ing] productive relations in particular and
capitalism in general out of existence." Davis, supra note 31, at 858. Davis
endows law as Schlag presents it with a strong political orientation. Id. at 858-
59. Davis may find ideological bias in law as Schlag presents it, but, again, this
bias is best understood as evident in, or even endemic to, contemporary
deployments of certain aesthetics, not as endemic to the various aesthetics of
law.
39. Schlag, The Aesthetics, supra note 7, at 1052.
40. Id. at 1102.
41. Id. at 1109.
42. See discussion infra Part III.
43. See discussion infra Part IV.
44. See discussion infra Part III. See generally Mary Mothersill, Sublime,
in A COMPANION TO AESTHETICS, supra note 23, at 407-12.
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sublimity in the context of the grandiose adulation of both
commercial law and commercial activity that persists despite
menacing environmental, cultural, and financial effects of this law
and activity.
45
Second, Schlag contends that once conflicts in law are
understood as contests among conflicting aesthetics, debate
effectively ends. He states: "Indeed, once a dispute becomes
explicitly aesthetic, rational argument has reached a kind of
terminus. Once a dispute becomes explicitly a contest of
aesthetics, there is not a whole lot more to say. .... ,46 Schlag is
right if he means that there is no coherent meta-theory or mode of
reasoning that can be deployed to settle conflicts within law or
among legal solutions or approaches.47 The aesthetic nature of law
and legal argumentation compounds this reality.
However, there is a whole lot more to say about the
consequences of the aesthetics of law, and especially commercial
law. David A. Westbrook writes:
Our awareness of judgment, aesthetic qualities, at the root
of our reasons means that the epistemological status of our
thoughts and arguments are uncertain. We know that our
own minds are strange to us. Such awareness, however,
does not mean that thought is impossible for us or that we
somehow have been excused .... While recognition of the
aesthetic aspect at the foundations of our thinking may be
regarded as, in some sense, a terminus of reason, it should
also be regarded as the beginning of thought.48
Reason may not solve conflicts among differing, aesthetically
constituted legal tacks. However, excavating the particular
aesthetics of U.S. commercial law may assist legal actors in seeing
how U.S. commercial law models embody non-rational and
parochial preferences. Once these non-rational qualities are taken
45. Note that, though beyond the scope of this article, it would also be
interesting to consider the sublime in relation to the heightened experience of the
dissociative aesthetic in transnational contexts generally.
46. Schlag, The Aesthetics, supra note 7, at 1105.
47. See generally Kennedy, supra note 7; Schlag, THE ENCHANTMENT,
supra note 7.
48. Westbrook, supra note 31, at 342-43. Cf Butler, supra note 7 (arguing
that Schlag offers a misguided conception of what labeling something
"aesthetic" means in the study of law). Butler interprets Schlag's approach to
aesthetics as marking the limit of the rational. Id. However, Butler thinks of
aesthetics and rationality as two separate tools or experiences in a way that
Schlag would not.
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into account, they may appear compatible or incompatible with the
aesthetics and priorities of others.
Obviously, this approach (1) raises the problem of reflexivity,
(2) raises the issue of whether legal aesthetics reflect cultural
values, and (3) contemplates some future engagement with the
question of which aesthetics (and which approaches to commercial
law) are right or good. The problem of reflexivity is that this
article itself deploys particular aesthetics, raising a question as to
what justifies the use of these aesthetics to analyze others. 49 This
problem is not solvable-all possible solutions are aesthetically
constituted such that the problem simply replicates. (This article,
for example, exhibits the grid aesthetic, among others. If anyone
found the aesthetics of this article to be a worthy subject of critique
I would be flattered.)
There may not be any even remotely coherent justification for
using the aesthetics that constitute this article to critique the
aesthetics that constitute commercial law. The purpose here is to
make a presentation-certainly not the only possible one-of U.S.
commercial law as in a fundamental way non-rational by showing
some aesthetics that constitute it. Revelation of non-rational, pre-
reflective aspects of commercial law creates room for the
possibility of meaningful engagement with questions about the true
costs and effects of current formulations of commercial law.
The implication that legal aesthetics are culturally specific
pervades writing on the subject. Schlag's examples are all drawn
from U.S. law and he describes some of the aesthetics he discusses
as manifestin 0themselves most prominently at specific points in
U.S. history. He also occasionally identifies objects of
perspectivist (and other) malaise, for example, as Anglo-American
or typical of Anglo-American thought. 51 He does not, however,
otherwise address cultural specificity. 52 Other cultures may very
well experience legal aesthetics that are highly similar to, if not the
49. Cf Schlag, The Aesthetics, supra note 7, at 1101-04, 1054 n.23.
50. See id. at 1053-54.
51. Id. at 1084.
52. Perhaps the cultural specificity of the aesthetics of American law in
Schlag's project is simply too obvious to warrant discussion. Note that, in The
Enchantment, Schlag does state that his claims "refer to American law and
American legal thought." Schlag, THE ENCHANTMENT, supra note 7, at 14.
"The social and intellectual contexts in which law and legal thought is produced
in other countries," he continues, "is likely to differ and to require a different
analysis." Id. But see Davis, supra note 31, at 853-54 (finding that Schlag's
central claims in The Enchantment are applicable to many countries).
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same as, those we experience in the United States.53 Comparative
law scholars have vigorously debated whether laws or legal
systems can be universalized, or whether they are, on some level,
irreducibly culturally specific.54 This article does not intend to add
to this debate. Presenting aesthetics of commercial law and how
these aesthetics privilege commercial actors does not require
resolution of the question of whether these aesthetics reflect U.S.
culture.5 5 The purpose here is not to assert the cultural peculiarity
53. Duncan Kennedy's point that there is an aesthetic alignment of altruistic
arguments with standards and individualist arguments with rules seems to
extend to all of "private law adjudication"-a category of lawmaking that
extends, at least, to the common law jurisdictions. See generally Kennedy,
supra note 7.
54. For arguments that law is culturally specific, see, for example, Benjamin
Geva, Uniformity in Commercial Law: Is the UCC Exportable?, 29 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 1035, 1038 (1996) (arguing that "law, very much like language or religion,
is strongly culturally based"); Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of
Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 22, 40; and Pierre Legrand,
European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 52, 62
(1996) (contending that epistemological differences between the common and
civil law systems are irreducible). For arguments focusing on the universal
qualities of law, see, for example, H. Patrick Glenn, Harmonization of Law,
Foreign Law and Private International Law, 1 EUR. R. PRIVATE L. 47 (1993)
(on a global harmonization of laws); and Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal
Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT'L REV. L. &
EcON. 3 (1994) (contending that there is a common core of efficient principles
embedded across diverse legal systems). See also Duncan Kennedy, Two
Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
631, 641 (2002) (observing the contradictory notions in classical legal thought
that "[t]he law of a nation was a reflection of the spirit or culture of its people,
and in this sense inherently political, but could be developed in a scientific
manner by jurists who presupposed its internal coherence").
55. It is worth pointing out, however, that the aesthetics of commercial law
must be culturally specific at least in the sense that they arise out of the context
of the development of the UCC in the United States. This context steeps in
cultural specificity in the forms of, among other things: (1) the particular history
of legal realism and legal formalism in the United States; (2) the American Law
Institute's (and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Law's) efforts to draft codes in order to create uniformity of laws across
common law jurisdictions; and (3) the particular individuals in the United States
whose thinking has most influenced the UCC. These individuals, of course,
took inspiration from foreign as well as U.S. sources. See, e.g., Karl N.
Llewellyn & E. Adamson Hoebel, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE
LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (Univ. of Okla. Press 1967) (1941)
(exemplifying the realist interest in sociological and anthropological approaches
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of the aesthetics of U.S. commercial law, but rather to explore
what the particular aesthetics of this law are, regardless of whether
they are rare or common to the experiences of legal actors around
the world.
The methodology of this work obviates addressing the
"rightness" question with respect to specific formulations of
commercial law in any satisfying way.56 This critique may inform
legal actors who address the question of which aesthetics and
forms of commercial law are best. Note that even if these legal
actors subscribe to perspectivist or dissociative aesthetics,57 the
question of rightness dominates lawmaking efforts. Schlag writes
that, from the vantage point of perspectivist and dissociative
aesthetics, rightness "is demoted in favor of other enterprises" to
become "one concern among many," thus losing any "claims to
universality or intellectual supremacy."5 8  Such a demotion of
rightness, however, seems impossible. What other concerns exist
and what justifies their consideration if not a sense that, at least,
to the study of law); Egon Guttman, U.C.C. D.O.A.: Le Roi Est Mort, Vive Le
Roi, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 625 (1993) (noting civil law elements in the inception
of the UCC); Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the
Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 435 (2000) (discussing the influence
of civil law models on codification projects such as the UCC); James Whitman,
Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German
Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156 (1987) (discussing
the influence of the German professorial model on Llewellyn); see also John M.
Conley & William M. O'Barr, A Classic in Spite of Itself- The Cheyenne Way
and the Case Method in Legal Anthropology, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 179 (2004)
(book review); Ajay K. Mehrotra, Law and the "Other": Karl N. Llewellyn,
Cultural Anthropology, and the Legacy of The Cheyenne Way, 26 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 741 (2001) (book review). "Cultural specificity" does not mean that
the laws in question evolved separately and without influence from other
systems. See generally P.G. Monateri, Black Gaius: A Quest for the
Multicultural Origins of the "Western Legal Tradition," 51 HASTINGS L.J. 479
(2000) (discussing non-Western sources of "Western" law).
56. Schlag states that the possibility that a position can be "right" in the first
place depends upon the aesthetics of those engaging the question. See Schlag,
The Aesthetics, supra note 7, at 1107. The aesthetics of those engaging a
question determine what the possible, "right" legal arguments or solutions to the
question may be. However, Schlag's implication that an aesthetic exists in
which there is no right/wrong dualism seems inaccurate. Rejecting the
possibility of "right" legal arguments is itself a form of rightness argument.
57. See sources cited supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
58. Schlag, The Aesthetics, supra note 7, at 1108-09.
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the range of concerns on the table is the right one? The rightness
argument at issue here concerns the nature and consequences of
aesthetics of commercial law.
II. AESTHETICS OF COMMERCIAL LAW
Certain aesthetics obscure consideration of alternatives to
current formulations and trends in commercial law that can be
problematic. Parts of the UCC have been called a "beautiful
exercise" 59 that create a "logical and flowing treatment ' 6° of
security interests, for example. However, the alleged beauty of
commercial law is not central to understanding its aesthetics.
Several types of sources evidence the aesthetics of commercial
law. The UCC itself exhibits particular aesthetics. In addition,
certain often repeated characterizations of the Code in secondary
sources by scholars and practitioners evidence aesthetics of the
Code. 61 Finally, descriptions of the UCC's purpose and intent
offered by its drafters and official commentators evidence certain
aesthetics.
A. The Energy Aesthetic
Drafters and proponents of the UCC present the Code in terms
of the energy aesthetic. This aesthetic masks the UCC's
constitutive force. The energy aesthetic exhibits itself as
progressive legal change, as reform, as rejection of static qualities
as law on the move, responding to the changing needs of society.
62
The UCC claims to be energy evolving in response to energy-the
forward-looking evolution of the commercial world. This sense of
the Code denies (1) the extent to which the UCC creates and
causes the behavior of commercial actors, and (2) the extent to
59. Felsenfeld, supra note 15, at 605-06.
60. Id.
61. As discussed below, these include characterizations of the UCC as
technically masterful, efficient, flexible, responsive to the needs and priorities of
commercial actors, and practical.
62. For an older presentation of law as energy or facilitating release of
energy, see James Willard Hurst, LAW AND THE CONDITIONs OF FREEDOM IN
THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 3-32 (1956). In a chapter titled
"The Release of Energy," Hurst argues that the dominant value driving
nineteenth century U.S. law is "not the jealous limitation of the power of the
state, but the release of individual creative energy." Id. at 7. Hurst's focus on
release of energy as a central objective of law exemplifies an energy aesthetic in
law.
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which commercial practices themselves depend upon more fixed
and formalist elements of law.
The drafters of the UCC themselves express the energy
aesthetic. The Permanent Editorial Board ("PEB") for the UCC
(and its constituent organizations, the ALl and NCCUSL) issue
comments and reports on the text of the Code. The PEB has
undertaken to revise various articles of the UCC at appropriate
intervals. The following statements regarding recent revisions to
the UCC are from the Forward to the Official Text and Comments
to the 2004 edition:
The primary goal was not to create new law but rather to
bring the articles up to date in terms of modem business
practices and technology . . . . [Article 8] was revised in
1994, primarily to provide a full set of rules for the
"indirect holding system" that had developed in the
securities markets in order to facilitate trades .... [T]he
PEB and the sponsoring organizations have been cognizant
of the need to amend and revise the articles in a manner
that comports with modem commercial practices, including
the now-Srevalent use of electronic methods of doing
business.
The PEB views the UCC as responding to constantly evolving
practices in the commercial world. Business practices evolve and
allegedly become ever more "modem." 64 It is the job of the
drafters of the UCC to react to this progress by codifying the rules
and norms that commercial practices reflect. Technology and
commercial practices develop in tandem. The law-the UCC-
responds to encourage and facilitate these tandem forces driving
commercial activity. It is law as energy, charging forward,
reacting to and partnering with the forward-moving energy of the
commercial world. The PEB denies even that it intends to create
new law. Rather, it simply updates the UCC to keep it current with
ever-changing business practices. The market determines the law;
the law reflects and facilitates the market.
The PEB continues by thanking those "who patiently worked
to improve the laws so crucial to the economy of the United
States. 65 The PEB recognizes the centrality of law to commercial
practices, yet it insists upon a narrow view of commercial law's
importance. This law is crucial in that, if not well-drafted and
63. Lance Liebman, Forward to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE xxv (2004).
64. For a critique of this notion that commercial practices and commercial
law are "modem" or constantly "modernizing," see discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
65. Liebman, supra note 63, at xxvi.
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updated, it could create stumbling blocks for commercial actors or
cause inefficiencies. It must maintain its momentum to keep up
with the energetic economy that it serves.
Consider the official comment to U.C.C. § 2-101, introducing
the UCC's departure in Article 2 (Sales) from the notion that
legal consequences turn upon the passing of title from the seller
to the buyer: "The purpose is to avoid making practical issues
between practical men turn upon the location of an intangible
something .... , 66 In other words, the UCC is for practical men.
Practical men should not be made to fret over legal formalities that
are too abstract and archaic to be of value to the commercial world.
Karl Llewellyn found the use of property "pigeonholes" too static,
too absolutist to serve as a basis for resolving commercial
disputes. 67  The UCC's purpose is to move commercial law
forward by making it more adaptable to the practical issues that
commercial actors face.
This energy aesthetic privileges commercial actors in that,
whatever forms into which financings evolve, however business
practices develop, once they become common modes of moving
large amounts of capital, commercial law will likely seek to
accommodate them. Commercial actors are privileged in that the
UCC views commercial practices as prior to the law. These actors
realize this privilege when commercial practices develop that
courts and legislatures sanction in light of projected economic
consequences of threatening dominant market conventions.
The energy aesthetic surfaces in adjudication of commercial
law cases as decisions abound which use commercial utility as a
justification in their reasoning. 68 Ross Cranston notes that Lord
Mansfield's judgments provide various examples. 69
For a contemporary example, consider the U.S. district court's
opinion in Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear Stearns & Co. 70 This
66. U.C.C. § 2-101 cmt. (2000).
67. Michael G. Bridge et al., Functionalism, and Understanding the Law of
Secured Transactions, 44 McGILL L.J. 567, 573 (1999).
68. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997);
ProCd, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Rinaldi v. Iomega
Corp., No. 98C-09-064-RRC, 1999 WL 1442014 (Del. Super. Ct., Sept. 3,
1999); but see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
69. See Ross Cranston, Commercial Law and Commercial Activity, in
COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS 274, 284 & n.50 (Ross Cranston & Roy Goode eds., 1993)
[hereinafter COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW].
70. 17 F. Supp. 2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that UCC Article 9 does
not apply to a repurchase agreement in which the parties explicitly stated intent
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case held that transactions conducted under a securities repurchase
agreement, or "repo," constitute sales and not secured loans.7'
Under a repo, a seller sells a security to a buyer. The buyer in a
repo is a securities broker and the seller is the broker's customer.
The seller agrees to repurchase the security within a specified
period of time at a specified price that typically reflects the
purchase price plus a margin that may be regarded as a creditor's
interest charge for a loan. If the seller fails to repurchase, the
buyer typically has the right to sell the security on the open market
to satisfy the seller's liability.
Repos are hybrid transactions that contain elements of both
sales and secured loans. Courts, like the court in Granite Partners,
have had to address the issue of whether repos constitute sales or
secured loans in order to determine the rights and liabilities of the
parties when a dispute arises. On the one hand, the buyer (broker)
has the right to dispose of the securities if the repurchase
obligation is not met. On the other hand, the purpose of these
transactions is to finance purchases of securities by the seller
(broker's customer). It is the "buyer's" loan, in the form of the
"purchase price" that enables the "seller" to purchase the securities
in the first place. The buyer holds the securities as collateral for
this loan. The fact that the buyer can dispose of the securities if
the seller fails to repurchase functions like a lender's remedy upon
default. Brokers have a strong interest in characterizing these
transactions as sales because, as buyers, they are not obligated to
dispose of the collateral in accordance with the strictures of UCC
Article 9. Among other things, UCC Article 9 requires secured
parties to dispose of collateral after default in a commercially
reasonable manner and provides debtors with certain, non-
waivable rights surrounding disposition of collateral.72
The parties in Granite Partners entered into an industry form
repo agreement containing explicit language stating that the parties
intend that all transactions thereunder be sales and purchases and
not loans. 73 The court in Granite Partners, considering how to
characterize this contract, found that this express language was
sufficient evidence that the parties intended a sale.74 The court
to treat purchases as sales and not loans). For a discussion of the grid aesthetic
at play in this case and how it, too, privileges commercial actors, see infra Part
II.B.
71. Granite Partners, 17 F. Supp. 2d 275.
72. See U.C.C. §§ 9-610(b), 9-602 (2001).
73. Granite Partners, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 300-05.
74. Id. at 300-03.
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subordinated the economic substance, of the transaction and the
subjective intent of the parties to the form of the agreement.
Granite Partners is one example of an opinion in which the
energy aesthetic is at work.75 From the vantage point of the energy
aesthetic, law evolves to accommodate dominant market practices.
Judge Sweet emphasizes brokers' needs for liquidity (that treating
repos as secured transactions would undermine):
According to the [Bond Market Association], repos have
evolved to fulfill certain market needs and objectives that
cannot be served by secured loans . . . .Applying to
repurchase transactions the provisions of Part 5 of UCC
Article 976 ... which governs the disposition of collateral
after default, . . .would undermine the requisite flexibility
of the repo market.
77
If subjecting the brokers to UCC Article 9 would slow down
the market, then it is better that they are sales. The opinion also
emphasizes that the securities at issue in Granite Partners are
mortgage-backed securities, the purchase and free trade of which
are crucial to the nation's housing markets.78 If the housing market
has evolved to rely upon certain modes of financing in which
mortgages are collateral for certain types of securities, it is the
law's place to accommodate this evolution-not to complicate it or
slow it down by analyzing the underlying economic substance or
subjective intent of the parties.
Yet, as commercial law scholar Jeanne Schroeder observes in a
critique of Granite Partners, this logic "can be used to justify any
pro-financer rule.",79 The fact that a federal district court engages
in this mode of reasoning is an example of the salience of the
energy aesthetic in interpretation of commercial transactions.
Schroeder's criticism only confirms this salience.
The energy aesthetic in commercial law-the UCC as
expanding or contracting to make room for market innovations-
can explain the efficacy of certain adjudicative tendencies. For
example, Judge Sweet in Granite Partners exhibits realist
75. Of course, the energy aesthetic is not the only aesthetic at play in this
example. See infra note 113 for a discussion of Granite Partners as an example
of the grid aesthetic.
76. Note that "Part 5 of UCC Article 9" in the opinion corresponds to Part 6
of revised UCC Article 9. See Granite Partners, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 303.
77. Id, at 302.
78. See id at 303-04.
79. Jeanne L. Schroeder, A Repo Opera: How Criimi Mae Got Repos
Backwards, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 565, 568 (2002).
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tendencies in that he considers market consequences of classifying
the contract at issue as a secured loan and not a sale. 80 Realism
itself is a school of legal thought-it is concerned with legitimacy
of lawmaking processes.8' Legal aesthetics, on the other hand, are
the pre-reflective preferences that affect our sense of the efficacy
of various theories of legitimation. Judges employ both legal
aesthetics and theories of law. The point is to consider how certain
aesthetics in commercial law-in this case, the energy aesthetic-
enable certain adjudicative moves-in this case, referencing
financers' needs for liquidity as part of the rationale for a holding.
Aesthetics make realist strategies, including the judge's choice of
relevant facts and factual outcomes, seem logical to others.
82
Consider Judge Sweet's (1) choice of important consequences-
brokers' need for liquidity and the extra importance of this need in
the context of mortgage-backed securities-and (2) willingness to
name these particular consequences in an opinion on the scope of
UCC Article 9. That these facts, offered to serve these ends, make
sense (to some, at least) indicates a pre-reflective preference, an
aesthetic proclivity, for commercial law evolving to accommodate
market needs.
The energy aesthetic drives evolution of the content of the
UCC itself. For example, the recent overhaul of UCC Article 9
exemplifies the energy aesthetic. UCC Article 9 governs secured
lending. It enables creditors to take security interests in a wide
range of personal property, including assets that a debtor has notr o83
yet acquired or that are not yet in existence. Article 9 gives
80. It is not necessary here to analyze whether Judge Sweet's opinion
exemplifies realist jurisprudence. The point here is just to see the difference
between a legal school of thought, in this case realism, and a legal aesthetic such
as the energy aesthetic.
81. Legal realism is complex to define. Essentially, it is a movement of
legal theory and adjudication that began in the United States in the 1920s and
1930s that asserts that judges decide cases based upon the facts and not based
upon the idea that legal rules require certain outcomes. Realism is the idea that,
of the range of stimuli an adjudicator encounters (that includes formal rules), the
facts of a case and the adjudicator's sense of the fair outcome based on the facts
comprise the dominant stimuli. It is the linear predecessor of contemporary law
and economics, feminist legal theory, critical race theory, and critical legal
studies. See generally Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 261 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999).
82. It would be very difficult to show whether legal aesthetics form prior to,
or as a result of, developments in legal theory. Lawmaking draws upon both
simultaneously.
83. See U.C.C. § 9-204(a) (2001).
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secured creditors full priority in the assets assigned to them. This
means that the secured creditor can recover the full value of its
claim against the debtor before other creditors recover anything.
Many scholars have criticized full priority secured lending,
charging that it is (1) unfair to creditors like employees or tort
claimants who have no opportunity to consent to the transaction or
adjust their compensation to reflect the risk of non-payment that a
secured loan creates, 84 (2) inefficient in that it permits debtors to
transfer costs to non-adjusting third parties, 85 and (3) potentially
84. Lynn LoPucki states that "security is an agreement between A and B
that C take nothing." Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80
VA. L. REv. 1887, 1899 (1994). Arguments that full priority is justified under
freedom of contract principles fail to explain why two parties-a debtor and
secured creditor-are permitted to contract away the rights of third parties with
no chance to consent or adjust their return. Employees are "non-adjusting
creditors." They generally cannot adjust their compensation to reflect the risk
that a secured creditor will be paid before them. Tort claimants, on the other
hand, do not choose to be creditors at all. They are "non-consenting creditors."
See generally id.; Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information:
The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1373 (1997). But see
Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property Based Theory of
Security Interests: Taking Debtor's Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021
(1994) (replying to fairness concerns by contending that security interests are a
form of property interest and as such are alienable despite effects on third parties
in the same vein as all other transfers of property). Security interests under
UCC Article 9 are interests in personal property that serve a range of functions
distinct from transfers of real property that are foundational to property law.
Also, from the vantage point of bankruptcy law, a debtor issuing a security
interest is alienating property that belongs not only to it, but to the bankruptcy
estate, which belongs to the debtor's creditors as a group. See Lucian Arye
Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L.
REv. 1279, 1290 (1997).
85. See Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the
Priority of Secured Credit in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (1996)
(analyzing full priority secured credit to show that costs of full priority can
result in inefficient contracting between borrowers and lenders); see also
generally Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 84.
The critique that secured lending persists because it enables debtors to
transfer costs to non-adjusting creditors stems from what is known in
commercial law literature as "the puzzle of secured credit." The puzzle grew
out of applications to secured lending of economists Franco Modigliani's and
Merton Miller's theory that the value of a firm is not affected by its capital
structure in a perfect market. See Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost
of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON.
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detrimental to debtors and unsecured creditors alike in that a
secured creditor with a lien on all assets of a company enjoys an
REV. 261 (1958). For a concise summary of this work by Modigliani and
Miller, see William W. Bratton, CORPORATE FINANCE CASES AND MATERIALS
481-85 (5th ed. 2003). When UCC Article 9 was first created, people thought
that secured credit served to lower costs of capital by lowering interest rates
available to debtors that issue collateral. However, Modigliani and Miller
showed that, in theory, altering the capital structure of a corporate entity should
not change its value. Id. Investors will simply adjust the interest rate charged
for debt and the amount they will pay for an equity interest to reflect the
riskiness of the investment. See Modigliani and Miller, supra, at 261-97.
Therefore, in theory debtors have no interest rate based reason to offer security
to lenders. This finding raises the question: If an entity cannot change its
average costs of capital by altering its capital structure, then why do debtors take
on the transaction costs associated with issuing security for loans? See generally
Alan Schwarz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051
(1984). Scholars focus on two general possibilities to explain this puzzle: (1)
secured credit produces efficiencies, see, for example, Schwarcz, infra note 88;
and (2) it exports costs to third parties, see, for example, Bebchuck & Fried,
supra note 84, and Bebchuck & Fried, supra.
David Carlson has rejected the terms of the "puzzle of secured credit,"
charging that (1) Modigliani and Miller's theorem itself is flawed because it
disregards the effect of capital structure on debtor behavior, and (2) in the
context of secured lending its application depends upon several, irrational
assumptions about secured loans. These include, according to Carlson,
assumptions that debtors are borrowing themselves into insolvency and that
proceeds of secured loans are used only to redeem equity. See Carlson, supra
note 3 (arguing that ordinary price theory shows that secured lending is
rational). The critique that Modigliani and Miller fail to consider the effect of
capital structure on firm behavior originates in finance literature. See Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECoN. 305, 332-33 (1976).
Also, since the irrelevance theorem (like many economic theorems)
assumes a perfect capital market there are other real world factors that affect the
puzzle of secured credit. For example, lenders are not deciding what rates to
charge given a debtor's value in a vacuum. Interest rates are heavily determined
by regulatory forces.
Modigliani and Miller's theorem has inspired extensive debate. The
fairness question raised by full priority secured lending and the possibility that
some debtors will use security to shift down-side risk to unsecured creditors
persist regardless of whether the prospect of exporting costs explains the
prevalence of secured lending generally. What portion of secured loans results
in exporting costs to unsecured creditors is, again, an unanswered empirical
question.
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inordinate amount of control over the debtor that it can exercise to
its own benefit.8 6  Other scholars have responded to these
criticisms, asserting that secured credit is (1) justified from the
vantage point of property law, 87 (2) potentially efficient regardless
of the existence of unsecured creditors,8 8 and (3) beneficial in that
the secured creditor's monitoring of debtor behavior will safeguard
the debtor's financial viability and hence its ability to pay all
creditors.8 9 Definitive resolution of many of these issues (as they
are presented in the legal academic literature) turns upon empirical
questions that are unanswered and likely unanswerable.
UCC Article 9 permits a sophisticated creditor to recover the
full value of its loan in advance of disadvantaged creditors like
pensioners or judgment holders. This full priority structure raises
serious fairness questions. Secured credit at least in some
percentage of instances enables companies to externalize costs
onto disadvantaged creditors. At the same time, secured loans in
which debtors issue security without causing economic harm to
unsecured creditors certainly exist.
Despite the robust, complex nature of the scholarly debate over
secured lending and the questions that it raises, the revised version
of UCC Article 9 enacted in 2001 only expands secured creditors'
86. Many secured lenders seek control over a debtor by taking an Article 9
lien. They are not concerned only with their priority in bankruptcy. A secured
loan agreement contains covenants and specifies events of default that can
include detailed instructions for debtor performance and actions. The covenants,
events of default, notice, and remedy provisions in the loan agreement permit
the secured lender to police a debtor's behavior and to take certain actions on
behalf of the debtor if the debtor defaults in any way. See, e.g., Douglas G.
Baird, Secured Lending and its Uncertain Future, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1789,
1792-96 (2004). In theory, the control that secured creditors gain over debtors
could benefit unsecured creditors and equity holders since secured creditors are
looking to be repaid, not to become involved in a bankruptcy. This theory is 7
dubious, however, because a secured creditor's interests and direction to a
company will not necessarily coincide with unsecured creditors' interests. See
Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARv. L. REV.
625, 671 (1997). Also, in bankruptcy a floating lien creditor will not represent
unsecured creditors' interests. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of
Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REv. 795, 818-19 (2004).
87. See Harris & Mooney, Jr., supra note 84.
88. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 3; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for
the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DuKE L.J. 425, 429 (1997).
89. See sources cited supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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domain. 90 Practitioners and commentators celebrate this expansion
for its facilitation of access to credit. The increased commercial
lending it enables facilitates the forward march of business finance.
Law evolves in tandem with evolving business norms.
The energy aesthetic notion that commercial law has a
momentum that tracks the momentum of ever-evolving forms of
commercial activity obscures the UCC's origins and, along with
them, the feasibility of alternative possibilities or trajectories for
commercial law. Allen R. Kamp writes: "The first argument for
the floating lien was that it was experimental and rare, so why not
try it. Now the argument is that it is universal, so it must be good.
One gets the feeling that its supporters will be for it whatever the
reality."91  Kamp indicates that the floating lien 9y was a novel
approach to security interests at the time of the creation of UCC
Article 9. The notion that this legal innovation created current
forms of and expectations for secured transactions is obscured by
the energy aesthetic's view of commercial law as responding to
market expectations that are already ever-expanding. Now that the
floating lien is widely used and secured lenders have come to
expect it, it seems beyond review. Kamp implies that the full
priority floating lien has a momentum, an energy, that precludes
90. For example, old Article 9 only covered deposit accounts insofar as they
constituted proceeds of other collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-104(1) (1999). Revised
Article 9 generally permits security interests in deposit accounts as original
collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-109 (2001). Old Article 9 only applied to sales of
receivables arising from goods or services transactions (accounts). See U.C.C. §
9-104 (1999). It did not cover rights to payment arising from other transactions.
Revised Article 9 covers a broader spectrum of sales of receivables. The
definition of "accounts" is expanded to include payment obligations arising from
the sale, lease, or license of all kinds of tangible and intangible property. See
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2001). Revised Article 9 also covers commercial tort
claims, software, and letter of credit rights, all of which were excluded under old
Article 9. See id. §§ 9-102(a)(75), 9-102(a)(13), 9-102(a)(51), 9-107. Also,
revised Article 9 elevates the claims of secured creditors above those of
unsecured creditors in the event of filing defects. See id. §§ 9-516(b), 9-338.
91. Letter from Allen R. Kamp to author (May 4, 2006) (on file with
author).
92. "Floating lien" is a short-hand term for the type of security interest
permitted by UCC Article 9 that attaches to after-acquired collateral and that
dates priority for future advances by the lender back to the date the lender first
perfected its interest. See U.C.C. §§ 9-204, 9-205, 9-323 (2001). Again, for a
discussion of the fairness and efficiency problems raised by UCC Article 9's full
priority, floating lien structure, see sources cited supra notes 84-89 and
accompanying text.
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serious reconsideration of its merits. The recent overhaul of UCC
Article 9-during which the drafters flatly dismissed proposals to
soften its full priority structure in favor of disadvantaged
creditors 93-- evidences this momentum.
Commercial law responds to secured creditors' and businesses'
needs. Commercial law's constitutive qualities-the notion that
market practices are created (and can be limited) by commercial
law-are suppressed as the PEB, adjudicators like Judge Sweet,
and the drafters of revised Article 9 treat commercial law as if it
exists to serve the market.
B. The Grid Aesthetic
The grid aesthetic is prominent in U.S. commercial law. It
exacerbates ethical considerations regarding the environment and
labor. In the grid aesthetic, law is a framed territory that can be
mapped by subdivision into distinct parts: contracts, administrative
law, etc. The grid aesthetic encourages micro thought. The
bounded spaces and defined concepts (collateral security rules,
labor regulations) can be treated as discrete subject matter,
enabling division of labor among legal thinkers and lawmakers.
The grid aesthetic (so pervasive in the UCC) puts certain
regulatory responses to commercial activity out of the purview of
the Code ex ante. Imagine a provision making unenforceable
security interests granted in exchange for loans that the debtor
services with capital generated by violating certain labor or
environmental standards. In theory, we could achieve such a
hypothetical reform by revising U.C.C. § 9-20394 to say that
93. The Article 9 drafting committee rejected a "Carve-Out Proposal"
submitted by Warren in April 1996 to amend U.C.C. § 9-301 to preserve twenty
percent of debtors' assets for unsecured creditors. Under Warren's proposal, a
levying creditor could obtain twenty percent of the value of Article 9 collateral
through a levy and execution under state law. Accordingly, in bankruptcy, a
trustee using her power could carve out twenty percent of the value of a debtor's
encumbered personal property for the benefit of the estate. At the Symposium
on the Priority of Secured Debt at Cornell Law School in 1997, Steven Harris
announced that a carve-out for unsecured creditors is "dead in the water."
Warren, supra note 84, at 1374 n.3. See also William J. Woodward, Jr., The
Realist and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common-Law Courts, and the
Article 9 Reform Process, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1511, 1511-13 (1997).
94. Section 9-203 states the requirements for creating an enforceable
security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-203 (2001). When a security interest is
enforceable, a lender has the right to foreclose on the debtor's assets if the
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debtors do not have, within the meaning of the statute, "rights in
collateral" acquired while in violation of, let us say, environmental
regulations.
95
Would this type of reform be good? Would it facilitate
corporate responsibility by making lenders directly bear risk for
environmental costs? Or would it result in a dearth of available
financing such that companies cannot undertake value-adding
projects that employ people? We just do not know: certain
aesthetics of commercial law deter engagement with these
questions. The UCC denies its ability to entertain such a rule by
presenting its consonance with priorities of commercial actors as
the basis for its existence and success. The grid aesthetic is a pre-
reflective notion that incorporating environmental standards into
the UCC is somehow unattractive or cumbersome. The UCC
belongs in the commercial law box; laws meant to deal with
environmental issues belong in the environmental law box, etc.
96
The UCC exhibits the grid aesthetic in that it is divided into
discrete articles, each dealing with its own subject matter. The
Code as a whole deals with commercial law rules, as opposed to
any other category of rules. Within the Code, Article 2 governs
Sales, Article 3 governs Negotiable Instruments, Article 4 governs
Bank Deposits and Collections, Article 5 governs Letters of Credit,
and so on. Within these articles one finds further grid-like
classifications. Article 9 on Secured Transactions, for example,
classifies different kinds of personal property into different,
discrete categories of collateral, such as accounts, general
intangibles, investment property, and goods. Each has its own
rules for perfection.
97
debtor defaults under the loan agreement. One requirement for enforceability of
a security interest is that the debtor have rights in the collateral. Id.
95. Of course, such a revision would raise a host of policy and technical
considerations that are not within the scope of this article. This hypothetical
reform merely proposes that, in theory, the UCC could incite-through creditor
control and restricting access to credit-internalizing costs to third parties.
96. It might be difficult to work environmental law concerns or labor law
concerns directly into a commercial code. However, the fact that-as a statutory
drafting matter-the boxes of the grid may be necessary does not justify
complete disregard of third party effects of the laws at issue. The point here is
to illuminate how the grid aesthetic privileges commercial actors by encouraging
disregard of third party effects.
97. "Perfection," in commercial law, is the method by which a secured
creditor makes its claim to the debtor's assets enforceable against other possible
claimants.
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Article 9 treats "like" collateral alike regardless of how
different two pieces of "like" collateral may be in practice. For
example, the rules for creating, perfecting, and enforcing a security
interest in shares of a corporation are the same regardless of
whether the corporation is a special purpose vehicle that does
nothing but hold assets or a large, operating entity with many
employees and other creditors.
On a macro-level-taking the UCC as a whole-the grid
aesthetic enables commercial actors to ignore third party effects of
commercial transactions as such effects are deemed the province of
some other box in the grid, like labor regulation. The integrity of
the grid aesthetic depends upon clear distinctions in subject matter
between commercial transactions and other kinds of legal
transactions. The very concept of effects of a transaction-as in
"third party effects" or "extemalities"--is a function of this grid
aesthetic. Costs, rights, and liabilities of the lender(s) and
debtor(s) that enter into a given secured loan, for example, are
handled in the transaction documents and the UCC. Costs, rights,
and liabilities incurred by other persons as a result of the same
secured loan are "effects" or "externalities" that are typically
outside of the purview of the UCC. Effects of commercial
transactions on third parties are separated out to maintain the
integrity of commercial law as a discrete category on the grid.
The distinction between commercial law and other bodies of
law is reinforced by divisions of labor among legal professionals,
the boundaries of the other units of the grid into which commercial
law is not supposed to extend, and divisions within the curricula
for training lawyers. The grids within the UCC, however, prove at
points to be difficult to sustain. There is no line separating certain
kinds of Sales (Article 2) from Secured Transactions (Article 9),
for example. 98 In other words, the wall between commercial law
and other fields seems remarkably resilient such that, for example,
an effort to limit secured lending to protect third parties from
practices that are supposed to be policed by other codes seems
politically infeasible. But at the same time, legal and commercial
actors commonly recognize the walls of the grid within the
commercial law box as fluid and manipulate categories of
commercial transactions. In many instances, they do so to
externalize costs onto unsophisticated or non-consenting parties. 99
98. For example, sales of rights to payment behave economically like
secured loans. UCC Article 9 covers these sales. See sources cited infra notes
106-08 and accompanying text.
99. For example, financers will disguise secured loans as leases in order to
avoid having their collateral included in a bankruptcy estate such that a
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Many types of financing are difficult to categorize as sales or
leases or secured loans (including repos). Standing alone, the fact
that a financing is difficult to characterize does not mean that it has
negative effects on weaker parties. This section considers one type
of financing, asset securitization, (1) to show the power of the grid
aesthetic in commercial law, and (2) to illustrate how some
sophisticated financers invoke and manipulate the grid, such that
(3) the grid aesthetic privileges commercial actors in ways that can
produce socially undesirable results. Asset securitizations are
among the many kinds of transactions that contain elements of
both sales and secured transactions. The practice of securitization
shows how the grid aesthetic pervades commercial law and shapes
the expectations of commercial actors.
In an asset securitization, a company sells assets to a special
purpose vehicle ("SPV") that it forms for the sole purpose of
purchasing assets. The SPV then issues securities or borrows
funds secured by assets it purchased from the parent company.
The proceeds of the issuance or loan are passed from the SPV to
the company in the form of the purchase price that the SPV pays
for the assets. The SPV is set up to be bankruptcy remote-
meaning it has no creditors (other than the investors providing the
financing in the securitization itself) and it is sufficiently separate
from the company to avoid consolidation in bankruptcy. This
enables the company to raise or borrow funds at a lower rate than it
could directly because the SPV has a credit rating that is unmarred
by the possibility of bankruptcy or the presence of competing
creditors. The company strips assets away from the reach of its
general creditors in exchange for cash that it can then apply in a
variety of ways.'
00
Securitizations can be challenged by creditors of the company
seeking to satisfy claims out of the assets the company shifted to
the SPV. The challengers contend that the transfer of assets from
the company to the SPV was to secure a loan and not to make a
bankruptcy trustee might disperse adequate protection (and not the collateral
itself) in exercising its power on behalf of general creditors. See, e.g., Am.
President Lines, Ltd. v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. (In re Lykes Bros.
Steamship Co.), 196 B.R. 574, 580-85 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (setting out a
range of factual considerations relevant to determining if an agreement is a true
lease or a secured loan).
100. See Chase W. Ashley, Comment, When A Company Securitizes, Its
Creditors Face Higher Risks, AM. BANKER, May 7, 1993, at 4 (contending that
the cash an originator receives is unlikely to stay with the company and,
therefore, securitization could hurt creditors).
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sale such that the company retains an interest in the assets. The
transfer of assets from the company to the SPV has some of the
elements of assigning collateral for a loan in that the SPV does not
always take the full risks of ownership that pass to the buyer in a
straight-forward sale to an unrelated third party.
Generally, parties and courts facing a challenge to a
securitization look to the "true sale" doctrine to determine whether
the asset transfer indicates a sale or a loan. If there is a sale, then
creditors of the company cannot recover against the assets
transferred to the SPV. If there is a loan, the SPV is a creditor of
the company that must comply with UCC Article 9 and participate
in any bankruptcy proceedings in order to establish ownership of
the assets if the company becomes insolvent.
Some scholars find securitization to be a form of judgment-
proofing.' 0' Companies can judgment-proof themselves by
transferring assets to the SPV and out of the reach of other
claimants in exchange for cash that the company can apply as it
sees fit.
10 2
Legislators, scholars, and practitioners persist in efforts to keep
asset securitization separate from the purview of Article 9 secured
lending so that challenges by creditors of companies that securitize
their assets cannot succeed. Securitization proponents invoke the
grid to insist that a clear distinction exists, yet the grid can have
trouble holding up. SPVs routinely file UCC-1 financing
statements 10 3 naming the company, or seller, as debtor. Secondary
sources continue to treat asset securitization as a cousin of secured
101. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 23-30
(1996); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing, 52
STAN. L. REV. 55, 59-67 (1999). But see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent
Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1999). At least some
securitizations are inefficient in that they enable companies to transfer costs to
third parties in order to fund projects that do not generate enough value to offset
these costs. Whether these inefficient securitizations represent a majority of
securitizations, or generate costs that are not offset by value created through the
practice of securitization generally, is an unanswered empirical question.
102. Though the company receives cash in the form of the purchase price for
the assets securitized, the company can apply this cash in a variety of ways that
do not benefit general creditors, including disbursement to shareholders. See
generally Ashley, supra note 100; see also Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization:
The Unsecured Creditors' Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595 (1998) (observing
that the investors in the SPE have no incentive to monitor an originator once the
true sales transaction is complete).
103. Lenders file UCC-1 financing statements to perfect security interests in
collateral.
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lending; °4 asset securitization occupies an important subsection in
secured transactions textbooks. 0 5 UCC Article 9 covers sales of
payment intangibles and promissory notes, 10 6 and includes credit
card receivables in its definition of "accounts" 10 7 such that the
overwhelming majority of securitizations are within the purview of
Article 9. The UCC does this in order to avoid the need to
distinguish between sales and security transfers of these assets for
Article 9 purposes. 0 8 Whether a transfer of assets is a sale or a
loan is a question to be determined by courts assessing the amount
of recourse that a buyer has under the contract in question.
The securitization industry has been threatened by the
possibility that creditors of companies securitizing assets might
successfully challenge these transactions. For example, in In re
LTV Steel, Inc.,10 9 Judge Bodoh issued a preliminary opinion that
ordered secured lenders to turn over to the bankrupt LTV Steel
cash proceeds of inventory and receivables that LTV Steel had
transferred to an SPV in a securitization. The opinion states the
following:
[T]here seems to be an element of sophistry to suggest that
Debtor [LTV Steel, Inc.] does not retain at least an
equitable interest in the property that is subject to the
interim order. Debtor's business requires it to purchase,
melt, mold and cast various metal products." 0 To suggest
that Debtor lacks some ownership interest in products that
it creates with its own labor, as well as the plroceeds to be
derived from that labor, is difficult to accept.
104. See generally Symposium: Threats to Secured Lending and Asset
Securitization, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1539 et seq. (2004).
105. See, e.g., James J. White, SECURED TRANSACTIONS TEACHING
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2002).
106. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (2001).
107. See id. § 9-102(a)(2)(vii).
108. See PEB Commentary No. 14 on Uniform Commercial Code § 9-
102(1)(b) (1994) (rejecting the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer, 955 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993), that the
impact of applying Article 9 to the buyer's account is that the account remains
property of the bankruptcy estate).
109. 274 B.R. 278, 286-87 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). This opinion had no
practical effect, however, because LTV relinquished its challenge to the
securitization shortly after the opinion was issued.
110. LTV Steel had securitized its inventory.
111. In reLTVSteel, Inc., 274 B.R. at 285.
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Judge Bodoh rejects the legal fictions that enable securitization
in favor of a real-world view of the interests of the parties at issue.
It is difficult, as a practical matter, to conceive of a shell entity that
exists for the sole purpose of holding assets having a legitimate
ownership interest in its parent company's assets sufficient to
remove them from the reach of creditors like the employees whose
labor created the assets in question.
In response to these threats, lawmakers get out the grid in the
form of asset-backed securities ("ABS") statutes. These statutes
override the true sale doctrine-and any UCC Article 9
requirements to establish priority as a lender-to state that a sale
made in the context of an asset securitization shall be treated as a
sale.1 2  This is true even if the economic substance of the
transaction indicates that perhaps it is better understood as a loan.
The ABS statutes put sales in the context of securitization into the
sales box. No economic substance or real-world analysis is
necessary (or permitted).' 13  The fact that lawmakers and
securitizers trust in this line-drawing exercise to raise large
amounts of capital against assets moved across a line, beyond the
reach of general creditors, attests to the power of the grid aesthetic.
The word aesthetic stems from the Greek aithsis, meaning, to
perceive. Adding the prefix "an" creates "anesthesia"--blocked
perception. The anesthesia of power refers to the blocked
sensations, the insensibilities, that permit those in positions of
power to inflict pain upon others without sensing or experiencing
112. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-1OA-2(a)(1) (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§§ 2701A-2703A (2003); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(e) (2003); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-425, 53-426 (2004);
S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 54-1-10 (2003); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §
9.109(e) (2004).
113. Note that the brokers in Granite Partners invoked the grid in order to
avoid liability under their repo agreement with several investment funds. If the
repo was a sale, then the brokers were free to dispose of the securities as they
saw fit. If the repo was a secured loan, then the brokers could only dispose of
the securities in compliance with UCC Article 9. Whether the agreement fit into
the sale box or the secured loan box of the grid determined the duties and
liabilities of the parties. The grid aesthetic enabled the brokers to avoid
examination of their underlying intent, which, in the case of Granite Partners,
would have resulted in greater liability for the brokers. It is beyond the scope of
this article to state how repos should be characterized. Granite Partners is
mentioned here as one example of the grid aesthetic at work, not as a critique of
the outcome in this case.
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pain themselves. 114  What anesthetics enable commercial actors
and lawmakers to disregard negative externalities of commercial
activity?
The grid aesthetic can be an anesthetic. By separating out
technical commercial law questions from other legal and ethical
questions, it excises from view and from feeling a whole range of
concerns-for example, concerns about employees or other
claimants (like the retirees in In re LTV Steel, Inc. rl5) left without
recourse because of classification of an asset transfer for
securitization as a sale and not a loan. The grid aesthetic permits
commercial actors to consider primarily their own interests. The
interests of others are not the province of commercial law.
C. The Instrumentalist Aesthetic
The close association of the UCC with legal realism indicates
the prevalence of an instrumentalist aesthetic in commercial law.
The UCC-both in its inception and in the revisions of its various
articles-is widely recopized as an expression of legal realism"
l6
and realist tendencies. 7  Of course, this is not to imply that
114. See Mab Segrest, The Souls of White Folks, in THE MAKING AND
UNMAKING OF WHITENESS 43 (Birgit Brander Rasmussen et al. eds., 2001)
(discussing the anesthesia of slavery).
115. See sources cited supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
116. For a definition of legal realism, see sources cited supra notes 81-82
and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., William Twining, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT (Univ. of Okla. Press 1985) (1973); Carl S. Bjerre, Secured
Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, Property and Perfection,
84 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 314 (1999) (referencing "that great Realist project, the
Uniform Commercial Code"); Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social
Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in
Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325 (1995) (stating that the legal realist movement led
to the eventual drafting of the UCC); Lance Liebman, The ALl and the UCC, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 645, 648 (2001) (describing the UCC as "a modernist and a
Realist document"); Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism:
"Things Ain't What They Used to Be," 2005 Wis. L. REV. 365 (2005); Gregory
E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn 's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 544 (2000) (stating that "the
U.C.C. has long been regarded as the apogee of the Legal Realists' practical
accomplishments"); Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the
Quest for First Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons
from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173 (2000);
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scholars regard the Code as lacking formalist elements.11 Rather,
the critique in this section is based upon dominant understandings
of the Code, which cast and celebrate the UCC as specifically
realist. 1 9
Annelise Riles observes that "the principal insight of Realism
was that law was best imagined metaphorically as a tool, and that
the lawyer and legal theorist was best imagined metaphorically
also as if he were a techno-scientist.' ' 120  Karl Llewellyn, an
original architect of the UCC, analogizes legal rules to tools and
materials for building; he describes the "exciting parallel between
rules-structure and physical building."'121 The "worded rule" is a
"technical device" for building rule-structures. 122  Further
emphasizing the tool metaphor, he notes that "someone at the
Contracts Round Table at the American Association of Law
Schools in 1941 likened the invention of transferability of contract-
rights, notably credits, to the invention of the wheel ....
The law as tool metaphor employs an instrumentalist aesthetic
in which law has the properties of a physical object. 124 It can be
picked up and used to accomplish the goals of multiple, diverse
legal actors. This aesthetic imagines law as having a utility that
can be put to various ends. The instrumentalist universe
emphasizes infinite practical possibilities. The notion that law is a
tool implies that law has a utility detached from any particular
cultural or ideological commitments. The extent to which the form
of the tool limits the range of ends to which it can be put tends to
escape notice.
William Twining, Talk About Realism, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 329 (1985) (analyzing
the relationship between the UCC and realist jurisprudence).
118. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article
2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 710 (1999);
Bridge et al., supra note 67; Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in
Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 847 (2000); William J. Woodward, Jr.,
Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 971 (2001).
119. Note that the relationship between the UCC and its American realist
pedigree is especially important to explore as U.S. commercial law models are
exported to civil law jurisdictions without the same jurisprudential history.
120. Riles, supra note 7, at 980.
121. Llewellyn, supra note 14, at 233.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 233 n.5.
124. For a discussion of Schlag's approach to objectivist (and correlative
subjectivist) legal aesthetics, see Schlag, THE ENCHANTMENT, supra note 7, at
98-111.
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Riles offers the following insight about legal realism and the
tool metaphor: "In mid-century Conflicts ... the idea that law was
like a tool quite literally became a tool of its own .... In other
words, . . . metaphorical use of techno science in legal theory was
literalized; it became reality."' 125  Further, she asserts, "this
actualization, or mechanization of Realist metaphors as a kind of
'aesthetic practice' has proven far more durable than the ideology
of Realism itself."' 26 In other words, regardless of the current state
of legal realism as movement, the practice of viewing law as a tool
for achieving various ends remains highly salient as an
instrumentalist aesthetic practice.
Riles develops her thesis in the context of conflict of laws. But
this double-layered description-law as tool (a practical approach)
and the idea that law is a tool as a tool in its own right (a situs of
ideological intervention)-might be applied in a wide range of
areas of law. Contemporary understandings of commercial law
bear out Riles's observation. The idea that commercial law is a
tool has become a tool of its own. The image of commercial law
as a tool for spurring economic growth is itself a tool that
advocates can use to advance law reforms that further neo-liberal
policies. 127
The law and development movement of the 1960s came to a
halt when its leading protagonists realized how little they knew
about how and when law and legal institutions matter for socio-
economic development.1 28  Despite this earlier movement's
demise, the notion that law reform not only matters but is crucial
for development has re-emerged in the form of a new law and
development consensus. 129 The consensus holds that once law-
receiving countries adopt certain legal norms and forms of law that
encourage investment, economic development and growth will
125. Riles, supra note 7, at 981.
126. Id. at 1009.
127. Neo-liberalism is an economic doctrine based on the concepts of open
competitive markets, of determining prices by supply and demand (and not
government intervention), and of free trade or the absence of barriers to
participation in markets. It regards wealth maximization through investment by
individuals and private entities as the best way to increase collective welfare.
See Susan George, ANOTHER WORLD IS POSSIBLE IF .... 8(2004).
128. See Tamara Lothian & Katharina Pistor, Local Institutions, Foreign
Investment and Alternative Strategies of Development: Some Views from
Practice, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 101, 102 (2003).
129. For a current, critical examination of law and development movements,
see generally THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (David M. Trubeck
& Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
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follow. In the field of commercial law, reform of personal
property collateral security rules sits high on the list of laws that,
once reformed, will spur development. 13
However, Tamara Lothian and Katharina Pistor have found
that experiences of practitioners involved in foreign investment
projects and of countries such as Argentina result in "confusion
over the appropriate content and scope of market-oriented reform,
including the reform of legal institutions that are commonly
associated with markets."'' 1 They write:
There is no direct correlation between foreign direct
investment and the kinds of detailed legal arrangements
that comprise a contemporary system of corporate or
financial law. Instead, the question must be approached...
through the examination of particular kinds of investment
projects, the interests they raise, and the variety of legal
forms and regulatory approaches available to support them
.... For example, a neo-liberal program of privatization
132
will require one set of legal reforms, while a commitment
130. As Lothian and Pistor acknowledge, there is more empirical evidence
today that law matters for development. See Lothian & Pistor, supra note 128,
at 103. Legal scholars and economists regard secured lending in particular as
crucial for economic growth. See Meeting of OAS-CIDIP-VI Drafting
Committee on Secured Transactions, Conference Transcript, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 311, 334 (2001) [hereinafter Meeting of OAS-CIDIP-VI Drafting
Committee] (referencing studies by the World Bank concluding that a country
with access to secured lending can raise its GDP by ten percent or more). Note,
however, that increased GDP may indicate economic activity that does not
necessarily further a desired range of development goals.
131. Lothian & Pistor, supra note 128, at 105.
132. Privatization involves the sale or concession by a government of assets
for private ownership and operation. Scores of water systems and utilities have
been privatized throughout the developing world. See generally World Bank
Privatization Database, available at http://rru.worldbank.org/Privatization/. A
project lender provides financing to private investors to enable them to purchase
assets from the government and make capital investments or improve
infrastructure. The project financing is structured such that the lender expects to
be repaid from the proceeds of the project-the water or utility bills--over the
term of the loan. The investors are attempting to improve infrastructure and
then recover their investment and make profits from the use of the infrastructure
by the local population over time.
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to a more radically democratic form of market economy
will require a different approach.3
Despite the emergence of a new consensus on law and
development (championed by the World Bank, the IMF, and the
United States Agency for International Development), it is not
clear that certain forms of legal protections for investors are
synonymous with development.
While experiences of practitioners and of various nations call
this law and development consensus into question, scholars present
U.S.-style commercial law as a tool for economic growth. Lothian
and Pistor find that generalizations about law and development are
"of limited use,"'135 yet generalized faith in the utility of U.S.-style
commercial law persists. For example, Steven L. Schwarcz, Bruce
Markell, 136 and Lissa Lamkin Broome write:
133. Lothian & Pistor, supra note 128, at 110. A neo-liberal program of
privatization would involve, among other things, reforms (1) to permit private
investors to acquire controlling shares of a project entity that owns the assets
being privatized, and (2) to create collateral security rules that grant a project
lender a first priority and full priority position in all present and future assets of
the project entity. These kinds of reforms might maximize the amount of
funding available for the project. However, they are also associated with loss of
local control of assets of collective importance and potential for exclusion of the
poor from vital services due to the private investors' control over rates (which
are set to service the project lender's debt). In other words, it is possible that the
ultimate beneficiaries of such reform could be foreign investors who profit at the
expense of local communities. A more radically democratic form of market
economy, on the other hand, might involve reforms that contain many of the
features of UCC Article 9 but decline to give secured lenders full priority in
advance of claims by workers for pensions or wages, for example. It may
reserve some percentage of a debtor's assets for certain classes of unsecured
creditors or it may rank certain unsecured creditors pari passu with perfected
secured creditors.
134. Lothian and Pistor cite the facts that Argentina suffered financial crisis
despite following every precept of the new consensus and that some countries
that have not undergone the prescribed legal reforms, like China, Vietnam, and
India, have demonstrated impressive economic growth. Id. at 111-12.
135. Id. at 121.
136. Note that Markell offers his own "view from the field" on the efficacy
of law reform for development. He asserts that the lack of rules like those in the
UN Convention on Assignment of Receivables in Indonesia resulted in
significant costs to a financer of motorcycles that securitized its rights to
payment. See Bruce Markell, A View from the Field: Some Observations on the
Effect of International Commercial Law Reform Efforts on the Rules of Law, 6
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 497, 504-05 (1999). Markell's conclusions on the
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Standardization of commercial law across borders through
the law merchant brings more certainty to trans-border
transactions, which helps increase cross-border economic
activity that benefits the economies involved. Such
standardization often requires many countries, particularly
developing ones, to engage in commercial law reform.
Often the IMF and World Bank encourage countries to
engage in such legal reforms.
137
The authors imply that commercial law reform (towards
models such as the UCC) is a practical strategy for economic
growth. Commercial law as codified by the UCC is a tool that
nations can use to increase economic activity that will benefit their
economies.
But consider (1) the diversity of actual experiences and goals
surrounding law reform and economic growth, and (2) the way in
which full priority secured lending and asset securitization, for
example, can favor investors' interests to the potential detriment of
third parties. 138 These factors suggest that, in some scenarios, the
idea that commercial law is a useful tool for economic growth is
itself a tool that can be used to benefit investors at the expense of
peoples of developing nations.'
39
To elaborate, a UCC Article 9 -style set of collateral security
rules would, in most contexts, increase businesses' access to credit.
This increased access to credit, however, may (1) require
need for reform and the value of laws that would facilitate securitization in
Indonesia may be completely correct. Lothian and Pistor's point is that it is not
clear from Indonesia's experience that adopting a certain set of prescribed rules
will spur growth everywhere. Lothian & Pistor, supra note 128, at 106 n.13.
137. Steven L. Schwarcz et al., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE, AND
CAPITAL MARKETS 172 (2004). Specifically, they describe the UNCITRAL's
Convention on Assignment of Receivables as a reform that, where adopted,
"should provide sufficient certainty to allow expansion of securitization . . .
which in turn will enable the Convention to achieve its aims of making more
credit available at lower prices to all economies." Id. at 195. The authors view
the Convention as a tool or object that, once acquired, will enable increased
credit. See also Spiro Bazinas, An International Regime for Receivables
Financing: UNCITRAL's Contribution, 8 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 315, 325-
27 (1998).
138. See sources cited supra notes 84-89, 100-11 and accompanying text.
139. Perhaps Schwarcz, Markell, and Broome do not themselves intend to
use this idea of commercial law as a tool in this way. However, their uncritical
reference to IMF and World Bank law reform initiatives raises the question.
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relinquishment of local control over assets that are important to a
community, 140 or (2) create burdensome debt that a company may
service by using exploitative labor practices, for example. These
types of negative externalities that full priority secured lending can
create harm local interests and benefit investors who collect on the
loan and have a priority position in their debtors' assets in the
event that debtors become unable to pay.
The findings of Lothian and Pistor, coupled with scholars'
assertions that U.S.-style commercial law is a universally desirable
tool for increasing economic activity, suggest that, regardless of
the actual efficacy of commercial law reform for bringing about
beneficial forms of development, viewing commercial law as a tool
is a powerful instrumentalist aesthetic practice. The
instrumentalist aesthetic privileges commercial actors in that it
enables investors to regard as tools-as practical devices capable
of a range of ends-forms of law that yield controversial
distributive consequences favorable to them.
III. THE SUBLIME AND THE UCC
[T]he legal structure of secured credit developed to make
possible the mass production and the distribution of goods ....
[TIhese developments have increased human welfare.
-Homer Kripke14 1
In a single recent year the United States generated 2 70 million
scrap tires .... Pollution oozes from them and fires are common.
-Dolores Hayden 1
42
The term sublime has a colloquial meaning-basically, it
means so impressive as to inspire awe. Sublime also has more
specialized meanings developed in philosophy. 143  These more
specialized meanings have attempted to address how it is that we
140. See sources cited supra note 86 and accompanying text on secured
creditor control. See also Ronald C.C. Cuming, Recognition of Security Interest
in Mobile Equipment: An International Approach, in COMMERCIAL AND
CONSUMER LAW, supra note 69, at 103-04.
141. Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic
Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 929,
931 (1985).
142. Hayden, supra note 3, at 104.
143. The concept of sublimity features prominently in Immanuel Kant's
work on aesthetics. See generally Immanuel Kant, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT
(Werner S. Pluhar trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1987) (1790).
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can experience pleasure from things that are frightening, things
that are menacing. 44 The sublime indicates feelings of horror and
respect, such as in response to violent forces of nature.
Sublimity is an experience, a human response. It is the
experience of feeling pleasure and fear at the same time in the face
of something much larger than ourselves. The energy and grid
aesthetics contribute to a sense of sublimity surrounding commerce
and commercial law. This sense of sublimity fuels dominant views
of (1) the UCC as facilitating a glorious, unstoppable capitalist
machine, and (2) constant expansion of commercial activity as
naturalized or a force of nature.
Homer Kripke observed that UCC Article 9 has enabled the
mass production and distribution of goods. He is not the only
architect of the UCC to cast its purpose and effects in grandiose
terms. James J. White and Robert S. Summers write that "in its
early days, the [UCC] was put forward as the grandest
achievement of all time in the history of private statute law
making.' 46 They report an ethos of "Uniform Commercial Code
Romanticism" surrounding the Code's development. 147 This ethos
"continues to prevail today in many quarters." 4 8
This ethos is corroborated by a sense of perpetually escalating
levels of commercial activity facilitated by commercial law. Boris
Kozolchyk, for example, references an "ever-increasing demand
for credit at reasonable rates of interest"'' 49 in advocating for
creation of a UCC Article 9-style uniform law for Mexico and
other Latin American states.
Contemporary commercial activity is menacing in both volume
and quality. We are aware of the painful reality that many workers
grow old to find their pensions unfunded when their prior
employer becomes insolvent. We are aware of environmental ruin.
Yet, commercial laws that facilitate these results receive
144. This concept raises a host of moral questions that are beyond the scope
of this article. For example, what is the relationship between the sublime and
the good? Does the sublime lead people to conflate a sense of spiritual elevation
with actual spiritual elevation? See generally A COMPANION TO AESTHETICS,
supra note 23, at 407-11.
145. Note that (1) and (2) here reference Kant's distinction between the
mathematically sublime-the absolutely large-and the dynamically sublime-
the fearsome unstoppable force of nature or power. See Kant, supra note 143, at
lxix-lxx.
146. White & Summers, supra note 1, at 21.
147. See id. at 21-22.
148. Id. at 21.
149. Meeting of OAS-CIDIP-VI Drafting Committee, supra note 130, at 335.
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adulation--even awe-struck admiration.' 50  UCC Article 9, in
particular, is called "genius."'' Superlative praise of the UCC and
of the UCC's adeptness at facilitating commercial activity, coupled
with the menacing aspects of this activity, indicate that sublimity is
at play surrounding commercial activity and law.
Immanuel Kant describes sublimity in relation to nature: its
vastness or the mathematically sublime, and its power or the
dynamically sublime. 152  Sketched briefly, in terms of the
mathematically sublime, we experience displeasure and
disempowerment in the face of vastness because no apprehension
is adequate to the idea of the infinite. But the ability to think of
that which is great beyond all comparison must mean that we have
special ability in which we take pleasure. 153  We experience
pleasure because through conflict we are made aware of the power
of our reason to direct sensibility and judgment. 154 In terms of the
dynamically sublime, we experience fear or displeasure in the face
of extremely powerful or menacing forces because we realize the
inadequacy of our physical powers of resistance. But, at the same
time, we come to realize the ability through reason to direct
sensible faculties not to fear in fearful circumstances. 155 We take
pleasure in this extraordinary ability.
We can conceive of sublimity in the context of commercial law
like this: 156 The colossal power of market forces and the prospect
of unending, unsustainable development are fearful; they cause
displeasure and a feeling of hopelessness. But, at the same time,
realization of the ability through work and acquiescence to gain a
share of wealth and the hope for collective wealth that will
eliminate poverty is pleasurable, is attractive.
The UCC is scary and it is spectacular. By encouraging as
much access to credit as possible, the UCC creates horrifying
potential for environmental destruction. But, simultaneously, it
150. See, e.g., White & Summers, supra note 1, at 4.
151. Ronald C.C. Cuming, Article 9 North of 49: The Canadian PPS Acts
and the Quebec Civil Code, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 971, 989 (1996).
152. See Kant, supra note 143, at 119-23.
153. See Donald W. Crawford, Kant, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO
AESTHETICS 55, 62-64 (Berys Gaut & Dominic Mclver Lopes eds., 2d ed. 2005)
(describing Kant's "Analytic of the Sublime" chapter of Critique of Judgment).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. This presentation of sublimity in the commercial context is not intended
as an application of Kant's theory of the sublime. The basic sketch of Kant's
approach offered above merely offers a structure for describing sublimity in the
commercial context.
2007]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
enables the prospect of spectacular wealth that could alleviate
poverty and yield riches.
Securitization is a multi-trillion dollar industry. Securitization
moves unfathomable amounts of assets into bankruptcy remote
corporate shells and out of the hands of normal operating entities
and the reach of creditors like employees or judgment holders. 157
This contributes to the sense of sublimity surrounding commercial
activity because the fact that corporations securitize their rights to
payment drives corporate incentives towards uniformity of
dealings with customers and maintenance of a clear allocation of
rights and remedies that heavily favors the corporation's interests.
As an individual, bargaining with a large vendor for specific terms
in contracts for goods or loans is virtually impossible. The vendors
not only have advantages in size and sophistication. They also, in
many instances, have committed their contracts with customers to
securitization facilities such that the company's expected cost of
funds depends upon uniformity of the terms of the contracts pooled
and securitized and the predictability of the pool's default rate.
In other words, commercial law's unabashed encouragement of
securitization 158 fuels individuals' feelings of powerlessness and
lack of agency in dealing with many corporate vendors. Sticking
to the form of mortgage agreement approved by investors that
purchase securities that are collateralized by certain mortgages is
far more valuable and efficient to a mortgage lender than pleasing
or retaining any one customer, no matter how loyal.
The same goes for large vendors of goods who sell on credit,
bill customers with invoices, or lease their inventory such that their
contracts with customers may be securitized. Manufacturers of
goods that have securitized their rights to payment have strong
incentive to use the contract formation and warranty disclaimer
rules in UCC Article 2 to ensure that customers can only return
goods or claim breach of warranty in very limited, prescribed
circumstances. In a securitization context, it seems, no individual
customer is as valuable as uniformity of customer contracts and a
low rate of refunds.
At the same time, consumers take pleasure in goods made
affordable by structured financing. For most in the United States
and many elsewhere, the pleasures of participation in markets for
goods instrumental in individual well-being, recreation, identity
construction, reward, and the like co-exist with the menacing
aspects of large-scale commercial activity.
157. See sources cited supra notes 100-11 and accompanying text.
158. See sources cited supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
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Sublimity in terms of potential for environmental destruction,
coupled with capitalistic behavior that is celebrated and
naturalized, characterizes contemporary real estate markets.
Issuances of asset-backed securities generate capital that home
mortgage lenders use to expand lending programs. These
programs encourage inflation in housing markets, producing
bubbles of wealth that benefit some who can participate in the
market and that exclude others from participation all together.
These issuances proliferate in response to continuing development
of industry form commercial contracts' 59 and recent legal
developments like the ABS statutes and revisions to UCC Articles
8 and 9.
Along with these innovations in financing, new houses grow
larger every decade. They averaged around 800 square feet in the
.1950s; in 2000, this average had grown to around 2,200 square feet
despite shrinking household sizes.' People take pleasure in
occupying larger and larger homes despite fears of environmental
devastation.
The energy aesthetic in commercial law' 6 1 contributes to the
sense of sublimity surrounding this law. Energy is a force of
nature (often associated with the sublime). Commercial law as
energy responding to the forward-moving energy of increasing
market activity and innovation naturalizes commercial law
developments. The experience of commercial law as energy in
service of commercial activity and of commercial activity as
invoking the sublime magnifies and exaggerates this law. U.S.
commercial law seems to stand colossal and naturalized in the face
of dissenters concerned with environmental consequences,
alternative views of property,1 62 or labor exploitation.
The grid aesthetic encourages a feeling that commercial law is
necessarily myopic. The UCC facilitates the commercial
transactions that drive the progression of capital. That is its
purpose.
159. These are standardized forms of agreements developed by industry
groups. These forms tend to favor heavily the institutional or industry party to
the contract. These forms are very difficult to negotiate. Negotiated deviations
from the forms usually only occur in contracts involving very large dollar
amounts.
160. Hayden, supra note 3, at 110.
161. See discussion supra Part II.A.
162. See, e.g., Mary E. Hiscock, Law and Political Change: Land Use by
Foreigners in Socialist Countries of the Third World, in COMMERCIAL AND
CONSUMER LAW, supra note 69, at 292 (discussing clash between Western
collateral security rules and aboriginal conceptions of land).
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How can laws and practices that contribute to distributive
injustice and environmental devastation be associated with genius
or awe? Some scholars argue that no matter how beautiful a
work-in this case, a statute-if its content is morally
objectionable it cannot be beautiful. Llewellyn himself has written
that "law out of harmony with life, ways of law which grind gears
with law's society, cannot have right beauty."' 63 The question put
in contemporary commercial law terms might be, for example: Can
UCC Article 9 rightly be called "beautiful" or a "crown jewel"
given that it (1) permits secured creditors to take assets in advance
of non-consenting creditors, (2) is arguably responsible for
decimation of American farmland,1 64 or (3) was conceived in a
process that heavily favored industry interests?' 6 5 Schlag finds this
type of questioning problematic because it uses beauty as a covert
vehicle for moral or political judgment.166 While it is problematic
to use beauty as a proxy for moral or political judgments, many
proponents of the UCC seem to be doing just that in pronouncing
the Code to be beautiful. This question simply challenges these
characterizations of commercial law in their own terms.
The sense of sublimity in commercial law-this law's
encouragement of destructive over-development and increasing
universality-seems farcical in contrast to the UCC's highly
parochial origins. A glance at the first reports of the PEB in the
1960s reveals the short list of sponsoring foundations and people
who created the Code. The ALI and NCCUSL, with the support of
the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation, appointed a handful of
American law professors and practitioners to revise each of the
UCC's articles in order to achieve uniform adoption of the model
Code throughout the United States.' 67 This relatively small and
homogeneous group, followed in various revision periods by
similar, successor groups, drafted the Code that now seems so
permanent and ever-evolving in favor of investors and industry
163. Llewellyn, supra note 14, at 248.
164. See Richard L. Barnes, The U.C.C.'s Insidious Preference for
Agronomy over Ecology in Farm Lending Decisions, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 457
(1993).
165. See, e.g., Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process
Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IowA L. REv. 569
(1998).
166. See Schlag, The Aesthetics, supra note 7, at 1118 n.7.
167. See Report No. 1 of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code (1962); Report No. 2 of the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code (1964); Report No. 3 of the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code (1967).
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participants. While, of course, many of the rules formulated by
this small group of drafters are drawn from commercial law's long
history, others, like the full priority floating lien, gained effect with
the UCC.
The relationship between commercial law, commercial activity,
and the sublime constitutes a warning to both domestic and
international legal actors. 68 This relationship complicates efforts
to cut commercial law down to size and consider the possible value
of legal limitations on commercial actors.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF AESTHETICS OF COMMERCIAL LAW
A. Common Refrains Against Reform
Efforts to cut the UCC down to size and create effective
limitations on commercial activity are met with some well-worn
refrains. One such refrain is: Any reduction in commercial activity
will most harm labor and the poor. Specifically, for example,
when commentators propose limits to UCC Article 9's full priority
structure-to create an equity carve-out 169 or establish priority for
tort claimants' 7°-they tend to meet debate-stopping assertions that
any such limits will result in credit constriction. 171  Credit
constriction will, in turn, harm businesses and reduce commercial
activity. Businesses must have as much access to credit as
168. Ugo Mattei proposes that "one may argue that the only way to create an
efficient setting for the global market is to develop a thorough and efficient
global system of control of externalities, something that requires mighty,
proactive institutions in order to be at all efficient." Mattei, supra note 2, at 436.
Yet, Mattei finds that just the opposite types of institutions---ones that
encourage externalities-seize and maintain power because of their "spectacular
appeal." Id. Mattei draws on Gui DeBord's conception of the spectacular, or
the spectacle society, to explain the persistence of inefficient institutional
models like U.S. laws that encourage market actors to seek short-term benefits
with no externality controls. Id. at 435-41. The idea of spectacular society is
intimately connected to aesthetics.
169. See source cited supra note 93 and accompanying text.
170. See LoPucki, supra note 84, at 1896-99, 1907-14.
171. For a critique of the political infeasibility of such proposals, see Heather
Lauren Hughes, Creditors' Imagined Communities and the Unfettered
Expansion of Secured Lending, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 425 (2005) (arguing that a
lack of critical discourse on business financing practices creates a political
efficiency to full priority secured lending and asset securitization that overrides
questions of fairness and of economic efficiency).
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possible, the refrain goes, and the law must facilitate that, or else
the working people will be the first to suffer.
172
Elizabeth Warren has asserted that this refrain is untested and
unfounded. 7 3 It remains powerful and often repeated nonetheless
both in domestic debates over the UCC and in debates over
commercial law reform abroad.
174
This refrain presents an empirical question that is unanswered
and a threat by investors that is untested. It represents a form of
"common sense" that is perpetuated by pre-reflective aesthetic
proclivities embedded in U.S. commercial law. Put crudely, the
idea that limiting or reducing commercial activity-such as
secured lending-is unthinkable because the costs of such
reduction will fall hardest upon those most in need assumes that
these costs are greater than, for example: (1) personal and
economic costs of relying upon a company that ultimately may not
be able to pay wage or benefit claims; and (2) environmental costs
of unfettered commercial activity that disproportionately affect
poor communities.
The aesthetics of commercial law discourage consideration of
these assumptions. The energy aesthetic encourages a view of
commercial law as evolving in response (and subservience) to
market needs. Bogging commercial activity down with value
judgments or holistic costs analyses offends this aesthetic.
Commercial activity is a force of nature with a momentum and
trajectory that precedes legal control. Commercial law viewed as
energy responding to the energy of commercial activity focuses on
removing impediments to generating profits-on minimizing
friction so that business activity moves forward smoothly. Any
friction will dampen the flow of capital, reducing the amounts
available to pass through to workers.
The grid aesthetic discourages consideration of personal costs
or broader social or environmental costs of commercial
transactions altogether. The grid aesthetic encourages acceptance
172. See, e.g., Steven Harris & Charles Mooney, Measuring the Social Costs
and Benefits and Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security Interests in
Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1349, 1371 (1997) (stating that "small
businesses (and, accordingly, minority-owned businesses) would
disproportionately" suffer from credit constriction if full priority rules were
reformed).
173. See Warren, supra note 84, at 1378-79.
174. See, e.g., Meeting of OAS-CIDIP-VI Drafting Committee, supra note
130, at 453-63 (participants voice concerns about absolute priority and are met,
in several instances, with statements of the necessity of full priority for
cheapening access to credit).
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of common refrains against reform by focusing the range of
pertinent costs to those of specific commercial actors, viewed
individually or collectively. Environmental or social
considerations are not part of the analysis of desirable formulations
of commercial law.
B. The Export of U.S. Commercial Law Models
This work on aesthetics is a challenge to the commercial law
community to more thoroughly engage difficult questions about
ideal forms of commercial activity. This challenge is especially
important as facets of the UCC model are exported to the
developing world. U.S. commercial law is exported in at least two
ways: (1) by countries adopting U.S.-style commercial law rules
(often to facilitate participation in global capital markets); 175 and
175. See, e.g., Cuming, supra note 151, at 971, 974-77 (discussing the
influence of the UCC in Canada); Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United
States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-
Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179, 277 (1999)
(citing the potential costs of isolation and correlative attractiveness of U.S. legal
models that facilitate access to U.S. capital and markets); Anthony J. Duggan,
UCC Influences on the Development of Australian Commercial Law, 29 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 991, 1004-08 (1996) (discussing the influence of the UCC in
Australia); John Gillespie, Transplanted Company Law: An Ideological and
Cultural Analysis of Market-Entry in Vietnam, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 641, 643
(2002) (observing that the World Bank and IMF often condition loan
agreements to developing countries in Asia on enactment of Western
commercial law models); Gunanto, supra note 8, at 1051-56 (discussing the
influence of U.S. commercial law in Indonesia); Horacio E. Guti6rrez-Machado,
The Personal Property Secured Financing System of Venezuela: A Comparative
Study and the Case for Harmonization, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 343,
346-47 (1999) (arguing for law reform in Venezuela to create collateral security
rules modeled on UCC Article 9); John W. Head, Seven Deadly Sins: An
Assessment of Criticisms Directed at the International Monetary Fund, 52 U.
KAN. L. REv. 521, 527 (2004) (describing conditionality of IMF loans); Markell,
supra note 136, at 501 (reporting that many countries are asked to adopt
Western-style commercial laws as a condition to receiving aid from the IMF or
World Bank); Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using
Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant
Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 847 (2003) (finding that many countries adopt
financial laws from the United States because of demand of investors for
legislation similar to that of the United States).
Note that a country may adopt "transplant" commercial laws based on
U.S. models for a variety of reasons. This article repeatedly references the
theme of the externally dictated transplant-a legal model adopted as a
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(2) by serving as a model in international convention drafting
projects. 176  U.S. commercial law, as an aesthetic construct, is
complicit in perpetuating imperial law, meaning, a dominant layer
of world legal systems that is permeated by a legal consciousness
steeped in deference to market actors.
A wide range of scholars and other legal actors frequently bill
U.S. commercial law models on the international scene simply as
pragmatic successes at generating certain types of capital and
economic growth. 17 7  Many commentators present reforms in
which foreign jurisdictions adopt laws, for example, of collateral
security that track Article 9 of the UCC as reforms that make sense
from an economic development standpoint regardless of social or
cultural values. 17  Yet, other scholars question the value of using
U.S. commercial models in other nations with diverse values and
condition to doing business with international investors and lenders. However,
countries adopt laws based on foreign models for a range of reasons, including
saving the costs of drafting new laws, furthering the agenda of particular groups
within the country, and generating legitimacy for the country's laws. See Miller,
supra, at 885 (presenting a typology of transplants based on different reasons for
their adoption); see also Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth,
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND
THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICA (William M. O'Barr & John M.
Conley eds., 2002).
176. See, e.g., UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS Art. 1.7 (1995) (enacting principles that mirror U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 1-
201, and 2-203 regarding good faith and fair dealing); Bridge et al., supra note
67, at 570 (finding that "the Article 9 model is proving to be influential in the
drafting of international conventions on security on movables"); Bradley
Crawford, International Credit Transfers: The Influence of Article 4A on the
Model Law, 19 CAN. BUS. L.J. 166 (1991) (discussing the heavy influence of
UCC Article 4A on UNCITRAL's model law for credit transfers).
177. See, e.g., Kevin Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, What Role Do Legal
Institutions Play in Development? 51-54 (Oct. 20, 1999) (unpublished draft
prepared for the International Monetary Fund's Conference on Second
Generation Reforms, Nov. 8-9, 1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/trebil.pdf (reporting that studies have found that
countries that give a high priority to creditors receiving the full present value of
their claims have higher rates of economic growth than others, but noting a
dearth of research on the relationships between the form of commercial law and
non-economic development indicia).
178. See, e.g., Cuming, supra note 151, at 989 (stating that "the genius of
Article 9 lies in the fact that it reflects the needs of modern business financing
and, as such, its basic concepts are universal").
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divergent legal traditions. 79  For example, Bruce Markell asks:
"Should global capital markets, and the commercial law reform
efforts they spawn, force Western-style rule of law notions on non-
Western societies?"'180 Their critiques stem from concerns for self-
determination and legal pluralism, and from skepticism about how
the wealth generated through globalization is distributed and
applied. 8'
Facilitating investment and access to credit in developing
economies is an extremely important goal. To the extent that
aspects of U.S. commercial law models can in fact enable fair and
efficient increased commercial activity, they are important models
for international legal actors to consider. However, the extent and
nature of commercial activity that U.S. commercial law has
spawned raise serious fairness, 8 2  efficiency, 183  and ethical
179. See, e.g., Carl S. Bjerre, Project Finance, Securitization and
Consensuality, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 411 (2002) (arguing that negative
externalities of international project financing make it disingenuous to call such
transactions consensual); Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity:
Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1 (1998)
(observing that marketization and democratization can conflict in nations where an
ethnic minority elite reaps the benefits of marketization); Mattei, supra note 2.
180. Markell, supra note 136, at 510.
181. This debate is driven, generally, on the one hand, by proponents of
globalization encouraging international law reform and rule of law projects in
developing nations that are premised upon the adoption of laws that facilitate
foreign investment to the greatest possible extent. Commercial law as conceived
and implemented in the United States is an effective set of such laws. On the
other hand, global justice activists, legal scholars who doubt U.S. commercial
law's compatibility with social justice, and others, question the export of the
U.S. model on grounds that it is an imposition of a foreign model on developing
nations.
182. See sources cited supra notes 84, 179-80 and accompanying text. Boris
Kozolchyk has written about the importance of fairness in commercial
transactions and of fair outcomes as an essential function of law when
facilitating economic development. See Boris Kozolchyk, EL DERECHO
COMERICO ANTE EL LIBRE COMERCIAL Y EL DESARROLLO EcoNoMIco (1996).
He writes of differing standards of fairness in different types of markets. Id.
The concept of fairness in commercial transactions should extend to third parties
affected by transactions and to the environment. In some contexts, third parties
have successfully established themselves as parties to whom commercial
transactions must be fair in order to succeed. Such contexts include, for
example, privatization of water facilities where community water rights, rates,
and access are affected by the privatization.
183. See sources cited supra notes 3, 85, 88 and accompanying text.
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questions.'8 4 Aesthetics of commercial law inform the context in
which we take up these questions.
1. One Theory of Imperial Law
Comparative law scholar Ugo Mattei's theory of Americanized
imperial law offers a provocative reading of the export of U.S. legal
concepts and models. Mattei describes a dominant layer of world
legal systems 8 5permeated by a hegemonic, American legal
consciousness. This dominant layer-the imperial law-coexists
with a layer of local legal culture in foreign jurisdictions that are cast
in contrast to imperial law as parochial and obsolete. Mattei's
theory provides one possible lens through which to read this critique
of the aesthetics of commercial law to consider consequences of
exporting the UCC model.1
8 6
A range of scholars have recognized a sense of dualism in law in
the developing world. For example, the notion of a gap between law
on the books and rules of society in Latin American legal culture
references this sense of dualism.187 This image of dualism can be
described as imperial in that it is used to further reform agendas in
which legal actors in Latin America abandon local, state law in
favor of foreign models or society-based, "extra-legal" sources of
norms. 188 In other words, the gap idea represents dualism. This
184. See discussion supra Part Ill.
185. See Mattei, supra note 2, at 384. This work does not necessarily
corroborate Mattei's designation of imperial law as hegemonic or as American.
Mattei finds this legal consciousness to be hegemonic in that it is furthered
through constructions of consent. Id. at 385-86. He finds constructed consent
to domination to be a key element of hegemony. Id. at 383. This article will not
take up the extent to which imperial law is hegemonic. Its purpose is to present
imperial law as a site for understanding potential consequences of the aesthetics
of commercial law. On Mattei's designation of this legal consciousness as
American, see discussion infra notes 196-200.
186. This article does not intend a full excavation or critique of Mattei's
view. Rather, it presents his theory of imperial law as a context in which to
consider the aesthetics of U.S. commercial law.
187. See, e.g., M.C. Mirow, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA 238 (referencing El Derecho y el
Hecho in the history of Latin American legal cultures); Jorge L. Esquirol,
Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV. 41, 53-54 (2003)
(critiquing the idea of this gap as a pernicious legacy of the law and
development movement).
188. See Esquirol, supra note 187, at 102-03.
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dualism becomes imperial in light of how it is deployed in
contemporary understandings of Latin American law.1
8 9
Mattei describes an imperial dualism in which local law (such as
Latin American' 9" law) exists on one level as parochial, highly
localized, formalistic, obsolete, and protective of illegitimate
elites. 191  On another level exists imperial law, represented by
international law and rule of law projects emphasizing technical
developments, legal realist tendencies, pragmatist approaches, and
deference to market actors. This dualism is perpetuated by images
of U.S. commercial law as a pragmatic, culturally adaptable,
technically superior tool for generating wealth.
1 92
Mattei understands contemporary imperial law as specifically
American. He states that the "puzzle approached in [his] article [is]
the relationship between the American and the imperial model."' 
9 3
He responds to this puzzle by assessing American influence in legal
scholarship, case law, and codification.' 94  He finds sufficient
influence in these areas outside the United States to designate
imperial law American, or dominated by an American legal
189. Esquirol rejects the idea that the gap actually exists in Latin America (at
least to any greater extent than it exists elsewhere). Id. at 83-84, 96-97. His
work resists imperial dualism in that it (1) presents the gap as a fictitious
holdover from the failed law and development movement, and (2) urges legal
actors to reject inaccurate conceptions of the possibilities for state and law-
centered reform that the image of the gap perpetuates. Id.
190. This term is controversial in that it suggests a common legal system or
common characteristics across legal systems of the various nations in Latin
America. This article does not intend any such suggestion. It uses this term to
reference the historical fact of this category of law. See id. at 47 n.4. This
historical fact is relevant to the nature of the imperial law and dualism described
in this Part.
191. See Mattei, supra note 2, at 444-45. The Americanized imperial law
that Mattei discusses arises in the late twentieth century. But the existence of
imperial law is by no means just a contemporary phenomenon. For example,
Duncan Kennedy observes that, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, "the Great Powers forced 'opening' to Western law, as a mandatory
aspect of opening to Western trade, on states not directly colonized, such as the
Ottoman Empire, Japan, China, Thailand, Egypt, and Iran." Kennedy, supra
note 54, at 640.
192. See Mattei, supra note 2, at 436-40. Note that imperialism, in Mattei's
view, "is not limited to a relationship between 'developed' and 'developing,' or
between a colonizing nation-state and colonized people . . . ." Id. at 401. It
imposes modes of thought world wide. It "does not necessarily need to be a
conscious effort." Id. at 402.
193. Id. at 435.
194. Id. at 408-09.
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consciousness. 195 It is beyond the scope of this article to establish or
even to opine as to whether Mattei's cultural designation is
accurate.'196 Such a determination would at least have to engage the
question of whether Mattei is conflating a distributive, political issue
with the cultural question.
Mattei contends that imperial law furthers Americanized
reactive institutions that regard economic and market forces as prior
to law.' 9 7 The courts in a common law system are an example of
what Mattei calls a reactive institution-an institution that reacts to
market actors to police the limits of legal behavior. The opposite of
a reactive institution would be an institution that views itself as
constituting and governing market actors such that it could force
them to internalize negative externalities of market activity.
Among U.S. laws that embody the notion that "the market
governs the law rather than the other way around,"'98 the Uniform
Commercial Code stands out as exemplary. Mattei observes that
195. Id. at411.
196. Many scholars have written-with varying conclusions and
approaches-about the influence of the U.S. legal system abroad. Some believe
that foreign legal systems are becoming "Americanized" in the sense that their
legal systems are evolving to mimic in crucial ways the U.S. system. See, e.g.,
R. Daniel Keleman & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americanization of Japanese Law, 23
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 269 (2002); Mattei, supra note 2 (espousing a theory of
Americanized imperial law); Paul von Nessen, The Americanization of
Australian Corporate Law, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 239 (1999);
Wolfgang Wiegand, Americanization of Law: Reception or Convergence?, in
LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 137 (Lawrence M. Friedman &
Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1996); Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American
Law in Europe, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 246-48 (1991). Others acknowledge
the tremendous influence of the American legal system but deny that this
influence is leading to a transformation of foreign systems into highly
Americanized systems. See, e.g., Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil-A
Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 321-23 (2003);
Miximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The
Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal
Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2004); Stephen Zamora, The Americanization
of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 391 (1993). Regardless of the extent to
which U.S. law is actually self-replicating abroad, as Miximo Langer writes:
"Since the end of the Second World War, and particularly following the end of
the Cold War, the American legal system arguably has become the most
influential legal system in the world." Langer, supra, at 1. The popularity of
U.S. legal training (most notably in LLM programs) evidences this influence.
197. Mattei, supra note 2, at 429.
198. Id.
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conceived "as a professional project of merchants,"'199 the UCC has
"very little in common with the 'core' political project of a civilian
code., 200  The political project of a civilian code, Mattei implies
seeks to shape society in terms of substantive visions of justice.
The UCC, in contrast, seeks to codify dominant practices of some
aggregate of merchants who each act in self-interest in the world of
the marketplace. 2
Some might criticize Mattei for expressing European resentment
regarding the triumph of American over European imperial models.
However, Mattei champions a strong, substantive civil code project
out of belief that such a project could better curb unchecked,
exploitative capitalistic behavior than the current trend towards
common law-inspired deference to market actors. He writes:
There is a pattern of development based on leaving the social
costs where they fall . . . . Reactive institutions . . . are
simply incapable of handling the tremendous pressure that
any attempt to internalize such externalities produces ....
Imperial law is an institutional setting that does not compel
market actors to internalize their social costs.
20 3
A mighty, proactive institution capable of creating and enforcing
externality controls would be required to create an efficient
institutional setting for development.
The United Nations Convention on the Assignment of
Receivables in International Trade204 is an example of what Mattei
calls imperial law. This Convention is designed to encourage
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See generally Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, 2 GLOBAL JURIST
FRONTIERS 1 (2002). Mattei's focus is primarily on codification in Europe. The
extent to which a civil law project undertaken to oppose Americanization in the
former colonies could be described as a kind of imperial project raises a
different question.
202. This view of commercial law is neither new, nor specific to the United
States. Bruce Markell notes that "the history of commercial law is in part the
history of pushing public courts to accept private norms .... Lord Mansfield,
when sitting in equity, would convene an advisory jury of merchants
knowledgeable in the subject of the case." Markell, supra note 136, at 502.
203. Mattei, supra note 2, at 433.
204. United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in
International Trade, G.A. Res., 56/81, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/56/81 (Dec. 12, 2001). At the moment, the Convention has not yet
received acceptance by enough countries to give it force. See United Nations
Group Drafting Secured Transactions Guide, NOVEDADES, June 2006.
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secured lending collateralized by receivables and securitization of
receivables. The laws of many foreign jurisdictions contain a
variety of features that impede the kinds of receivables financings-
such as securitizations-that are so voluminous in the United States.
For example, many iurisdictions do not permit assignment of
receivables in bulk,2 5 assignment of receivables not yet in
existence, 206 or of receivables containing anti-assignment clauses.
20 7
Also, these jurisdictions often require notice to the account debtor
when the account is assigned. UNCITRAL's Convention on
Assignment of Receivables overrides these local law provisions in
nations that adopt it,20 8 creating a layer of rules that apply to
international assignments of receivables 20 9 that are similar to the
rules enacted in the United States. The result in jurisdictions that
adopt this Convention is a dualism in which local law exists as
parochial and obsolete alongside the rules of the Convention, which
scholars and reformers cast in contrast as efficient tools for
facilitating access to credit.
The aesthetics of commercial law facilitate imperial dualism.
Some of the rules that the Convention is designed to override may in
fact be obsolete or of little value. However, others may provide
protections to third parties (like account debtors) that the local legal
culture deems important. Assessment of the potential value of the
local law's approach is very difficult to undertake given the
prevalence of (1) the energy aesthetic, casting this type of
205. Meaning, an assignment of all of debtor's receivables as a pool, as
opposed to separate assignment of each individual receivable.
206. In contrast, UCC Article 9 permits security interests in after-acquired
collateral. U.C.C. § 9-204 (2001).
207. In contrast, UCC Article 9 states that an anti-assignment clause will not
prevent creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in a contractual
right to payment. Id. at § 9-408.
208. As mentioned above, this Convention has not been widely adopted. See
sources cited supra note 204 and accompanying text. It is discussed here as an
example of an international law project that draws on legal concepts popular in
the United States and that fosters a sense of imperial dualism.
209. United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in
International Trade, supra note 204, at art. l(a). International assignments of
receivables, according to the Convention, are those in which the assignor of the
receivable and the assignee are in different states. Id. at art. 3. The Convention
also applies to assignments of international receivables, which are receivables in
which the assignor and the account debtor are in different states. Id. Once the
Convention applies to a receivable, it continues to apply even if future
assignments find the assignor and assignee in the same jurisdiction. Id. at art.
l(b).
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convention as a forward-moving reflection of market necessities, (2)
the grid aesthetic, limiting the concerns addressed in the Convention
to the facilitation of access to as much credit as possible, leaving
questions about desirable levels of debt and development goals to
other groups, and (3) the instrumentalist aesthetic, enabling legal
actors to treat the Convention as a tool of high utility, detached from
ideological commitments.
2. Resisting Imperial Dualism
This critique of aesthetics of commercial law is a form of
resistance to imperial dualism as presented by Mattei. International
legal actors who are aware of the suppressed, pre-reflective
preferences of U.S. commercial law can think critically about
whether U.S. models comport with their own priorities and
preferences. Exploring aesthetics of the UCC can provide such
actors with a vantage point and vocabulary to resist the idea that
U.S. commercial law merely facilitates a universal impulse towards
increasing commercial activity.
If imperial law is perpetuated by images of local law as
formalistic, parochial, and obsolete, the energy aesthetic perpetuates
imperial law by casting the UCC as a progressive, forward-moving
model. The energy aesthetic, again, presents the law as evolving in
response to the evolving needs of market actors. To question this
image of U.S. commercial law as a continuing, progressive response
to the needs of commercial actors is to resist the capacity of this
image to perpetuate imperial dualism.
The energy aesthetic pervades international commercial law
reform efforts. Frequent characterizations of U.S. commercial law
as "modem" evidence the prevalence of this aesthetic. The UCC
itself states that its purpose is, among other things, to "modernize
the law governing commercial transactions. 1  "Modernization"
projects in law, generally, are designed to make the law compatible
with new or evolving economic, social, political, or technological
conditions.21'
210. U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2006).
211. See Geva, supra note 54, at 1036-44 (discussing modernizing,
harmonizing, and unifying law reform projects). The idea of modernizing law
reform projects has roots in modernization theories of development. These
approaches to development, most popular in the 1950s and 1960s, contend that a
society's lack of development is a result of and is reflected in its adherence to
traditional (and not modern) cultural, political, and economic structures. See
Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 177, at 12. Though modernization theory is not
as popular today as it was in the last century, the idea persists that a failure to be
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References to "modem" (meaning U.S.-style) commercial laws
abound in literature on international rule of law efforts.212  The
category "modem" becomes a stand-in for desirability. The notion
that U.S. commercial law is desirable because it is forward-moving,
is modem, implies that other systems of commercial law that exist in
the developing world are not modem-are antiquated or obsolete.
Yet, what U.S.-style commercial law seems designed for is the
postmodem logic of late capitalism. 21
3
"modern," or to adhere to traditional social and institutional structures, impedes
development in certain regions.
212. Bruce Markell makes reference to "modem" commercial laws as he
reports that many countries are asked to adopt Western-style commercial law as
a condition of receiving aid from the IMF and the World Bank. See Markell,
supra note 136, at 501. See also Geva, supra note 54, at 1035 n.4 (noting that
"UCC Article 9 is the standard model for modem Canadian personal property
security statutes"); Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and
Monetary Interventions After the Cold War, 38 HARv. INT'L L.J. 443, 452-53
n.28 (1997) (noting that IMF conditions are not published; they become known
through reports in media, from governments, and from commercial banks).
Similarly, in a report opposing a proposed amendment to the Bankruptcy Code
designed to provide recourse for unsecured creditors, a group of prominent
commercial law scholars argues that the amendment "would effectively repeal...
much of [UCC] Article 9, thus relegating secured transactions law in the United
States to the genre of legal regimes that exist in many developing countries, with
corresponding impediments to financing and capital formation." William M.
Burke et al., Report on Avoidance, Subordination, Super Priority, and
Recharacterization Provisions of the Proposed Employee Abuse Prevention Act
of 2002 (Sept. 3, 2002), reprinted in Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney,
Jr., The Unfortunate Life and Merciful Death of the Avoidance Powers Under
Section 103 of the Durbin-Delahunt Bill: What Were They Thinking?, 25
CARDOZO L. REv. 1829 app. at 1867 (2004). They continue that "this repeal
would come not long after all 50 states ... intended to modernize the statute to
facilitate the capital formation that is so crucial to the health of our national
economy." Id. In these passages, "modem" indicates law that is updated to
accommodate contemporary commercial practices. It reflects the energy
aesthetic. Apparently, impediments to financing and capital formation indicate a
failure to be modem, an immature or backwards state.
213. The concept of "late capitalism" stems from Marxists associated with
The Frankfurt School. It suggests a final incarnation of capitalism before its
inevitable demise. See Fredric Jameson, POSTMODERNISM OR THE CULTURAL
LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM xviii (1991). Whether the Marxist theorists who
originally coined the term are correct about the inevitability of an ultimate end
to capitalism is not relevant here. Regardless of whether onset of late capitalism
marks capitalism's immanent demise, certain developments in modes of
746 [Vol. 67
AESTHETICS OF COMMERCIAL LA W
The scholars cited here may not intend, in using the term
"modem," to assert either a philosophical position (modem and not
postmodem) or the realization of an epoch (modernity and not
postmodemity).21 4 Yet, it is difficult to hear this term used to
describe contemporary U.S. commercial law without considering
both the energy aesthetic and the irony that social and political
forces that seem specifically postmodem drive the success of U.S.
commercial law.
The export of U.S. commercial law reflects efforts to bring a
range of nations into a global marketplace in which investors seek
amenable legal climates in which to access resources and finance
projects. Fredric Jameson has written that "late capitalism began in
the 1950s, after the wartime shortages of consumer goods and spare
parts had been made up, and new products and new technologies
(not least those of the media) could be pioneered., 2 15 Jameson cites
as exemplary of the postmodem condition of late capitalism: the
formation of multinational and transnational business
organizations, 216 the expansion of the "monopoly stage" of
capitalism beyond any national border,217 the internationalization of
business, 218 new dynamics in international banking, 2 19 coimputers
and automation,22 0 and the planned obsolescence of goods. To
the extent that U.S. commercial law models facilitate, encourage,
and create these activities, they can hardly be called "modem."
This point is important because describing U.S. commercial law
as "modem" functions to legitimate it, to make it desirable. If U.S.
commercial law is modem, then other sets of commercial laws are
pre-modem, are antiquated, are remnants of a past that should be
discarded for the bright horizon of accelerated capital formation. It is
difficult to understand and consider the merits of laws that legal
production and the expansion of capitalism seem specific to postmodemity and
to augment the postmodern condition. This section is concerned only with how
the UCC encourages these modes of production and this expansion of capitalism
such that it cannot be properly understood as "modem."
214. For a concise, general discussion of modernism and postmodernism, see
Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY 375 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999).
215. Jameson, supra note 213, at xx.
216. Id. at xviii-xix.
217. Id.
218. Id. at xix.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 4-5.
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scholars and the World Bank and IMF relegate to pre-modem
stagnancy.
Imperial law as presented by Mattei is marked by a deference to
market actors in the sense that these actors are not required to
internalize negative externalities of commercial activity. The grid
aesthetic in U.S. commercial law is a mode of excluding
consideration of such externalities. The grid aesthetic that pervades
U.S. commercial law encourages (1) increasing commercial lending,
trading, securitizing, etc., coupled with (2) relegation of the clean-up
to other legal regimes (that may or may not have adequate power or
authority to remedy any particular clean-up that arises). A more
holistic approach to commercial law that encourages responsibility for
consequences of commercial activity could perhaps better reduce
negative externalities.2 a2  Possibilities may exist in foreign
jurisdictions to construct legal models that force market actors to
internalize the costs of their transactions. Presenting disregard of
negative externalities as part of a pre-reflective, aesthetic preference
for certain divisions of responsibility within law challenges the notion
that this disregard is a logical or rational feature of commercial law.
The observation that the image of commercial law as a tool has
itself become a tool alerts people concerned with development to one
way in which ideology-laden arguments can take an instrumentalist
form. Of course, some commercial law concepts in foreign
jurisdictions may in fact be obsolete. For example, Boris Kozolchyk
points to a Spanish-colonial law notion in Mexico that real property is
more valuable than personal property, which is "res vilis, or vile
property."223 This kind of idea about personal property may have no
real contemporary value. Other concepts, however, may provide a
framework for considering third party interests or curbing over-
investment. Priority schemas that privilee wage or labor claims in
bankruptcy may be of tremendous value.
Aesthetics of commercial law discourage assessment of the
possible advantages of other models.225 It is difficult to consider the
222. The best prospects for such an approach may lie in using contracts
(specifically, loan covenants) as mechanisms for private lenders to shape the
environment in which they invest over time in a responsible way.
223. Boris Kozolchyk, The Basis for Proposed Legislation to Modernize
Secured Financing in Mexico, 5 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 43, 45 (1997).
224. See, e.g., Meeting of OAS-CIDIP-VI Drafting Committee, supra note
130, at 449-50.
225. This article assumes an intrinsic value to considering alternative models
of commercial law in the context of economic development. Arguments for
legal pluralism in and of itself raise a host of issues that are beyond the scope of
this article to resolve. Legal pluralism has an emancipative potential to reject
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value of alternative approaches to commercial law: (1) when the
energy aesthetic subordinates law to a facilitative role vis-A-vis
market actors; (2) when the grid aesthetic relegates consideration of
response to externalities to other laws and groups; and (3) when the
instrumentalist aesthetic implies that commercial law is a tool,
detached from specific cultural or ideological commitments, to be
used for a range of ends.
CONCLUSION
R.H. Coase stated that "problems of welfare economics must
ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals." 226 Coase
implies that aesthetics and morals are what are left after problems of
welfare economics dissolve, eluding the types of quantitative
approaches generally preferred by economists.
In the field of commercial law, certain aesthetics deter
engagement with moral questions about what forms and volume of
commercial transactions are good-about who is helped and who is
harmed by different formulations of commercial law. It is crucial to
recognize these questions given the contemporary volume and global
nature of commercial activity.
This study of aesthetics is not something that follows a
breakdown of quantitative approaches. Rather, it presents aesthetic
elements of commercial law that affect the capacity to translate the
results of analytical approaches (quantitative or otherwise) into law
reform. It is a point of departure for understanding the nature and
value of commercial law.
structures of domination if autonomous ways of living are possible and good.
So, to argue for legal pluralism as an end in itself, one must believe that
something is wrong with the current trajectory of developments and that
pluralism, if permitted to flourish, will yield alternatives that will be identifiable
as valuable and good. Further, in discussions of pluralism, it is important to
distinguish liberal legal pluralism-state attempts to integrate and accommodate
alternative norms-from personal, interest politics or forum shopping.
226. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1, 43 (1960).
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